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WATCHING THE RIVER FLOW: THE
PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVED
INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL
ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN*
Transboundary pollution creates some of the most intractable dis-
putes in the allocation of natural resources.' These disputes arise in
both political and legal forums. A lengthy political battle resulted, for
example, from the controversy surrounding the long-range transport of
the air pollutants that contribute to acid rain.2 After more than a dec-
ade, Congress overhauled the Clean Air Act (CAA)3 and assigned re-
sponsibility for reducing acid rain precursors such as sulfur dioxide.4
* Professor of Law, University of Kansas. J.D., 1977, Cornell Law School; M.A.,
1974, Harvard University; A.B., 1973, Union College. The author thanks his colleagues
Richard E. Levy and Sidney A. Shapiro for their helpful comments on a draft of this
article, and John ZoelIner, University of Kansas School of Law, Class of 1992, for his
valuable research assistance.
1. See generally Symposium on Transboundary Problems in Natural Resources Law,
32 KAN. L. Rnv. 1 (1983) (discussing interstate air pollution litigation).
2. See generally J. Wallace Malley, Jr., Acid Rain: A Decade of Footdragging May
Be Coming to an End, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 817 (1989) (discussing the future of acid rain
control and its potential effect on coal producers).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (Supp. 11 1990).
4. This decade-long effort culminated in the adoption of the 1990 amendments to
the Act, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-
7661f (Supp. 111990)). For a summary of the provisions of the 1990 amendments deal-
ing with interstate air pollution, see generally Timothy Talkington, Comment, Interstate
Air Pollution Abatement and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Balancing Inter-
ests, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 957 (1991).
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The most noteworthy battles over interstate water pollution have been
waged in the legal arena. In the last twelve years, three different liti-
gants petitioned the Supreme Court to force a polluter in one state to
reduce discharges adversely affecting another state.5 Most recently, in
Arkansas v. Oklahoma,6 the Court held that the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) has authority under the Clean Water Act (CWA),7
to condition issuance of a permit to release water pollutants on compli-
ance with a downstream state's water quality standards.8
This article analyzes the impact of Arkansas v. Oklahoma on legal
efforts to curtail interstate water pollution. Four sources of law are
potentially available to a downstream state seeking protection against
out-of-state water pollution: federal common law, the common law of
the downstream (or affected) state, the common law of the upstream
(or source) state, and the federal CWA. The Supreme Court precluded
resort to the first two mechanisms, holding that enactment of the CWA
preempted both bodies of law.9 Despite its continuing availability, the
third body of law is unlikely to provide effective relief to downstream
states. As a practical matter, limitations of common law remedies in
deterring pollution and the potential for bias inherent in the applica-
tion of source state common law preclude its effective use by down-
stream states.10
Arkansas v. Oklahoma represents the first time the Supreme Court
has addressed directly the fourth source of law available to down-
stream states, the provisions for interstate pollution control established
by the CWA. This article contends that, by deferring to EPA's inter-
pretation of those provisions, the Court has endorsed an approach that
imposes an unreasonable burden on affected states to trace the cause of
interstate pollution to particular upstream sources.'1 As a result, the
CWA is not likely to provide a satisfactory means of stemming the flow
of interstate water pollution.
5. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992); International Paper Co. v. Ouel-
lette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
6. 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992).
7. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
8. 112 S. Ct. at 1051.
9. See infra notes 13-43 and accompanying text (discussing applicable federal and
state common law).
10. See infra notes 44-56 and accompanying text (discussing the application of
source state common law to an interstate dispute).
11. See infra notes 213-27 and accompanying text (discussing the burden placed on
affected states).
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The final part of the article suggests administrative, judicial, and leg-
islative means of strengthening the remedies available to downstream
states.12 It concludes that, although it is too early to assess the effec-
tiveness of the 1990 CAA amendments, these amendments potentially
provide a model for the development of more effective transboundary
water pollution controls.
I. A SURVEY OF INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION DISPUTE
RESOLUTION MECHANISMS
States seeking to curtail water pollution generated in upstream states
have sought relief under both federal and state law, and have resorted
to judicial as well as legislative remedies. This section traces the devel-
opment of these remedies prior to Arkansas v. Oklahoma. In the
twelve years prior to that decision, the Supreme Court barred down-
stream states from relying on either federal common law or their own
common law. Although they theoretically remain available neither
source state common law nor source state statutory regulatory reme-
dies provide a comprehensive or equitable mechanism for addressing
the concerns of affected states. The prospect of effective resolution of
interstate pollution disputes through voluntarily-negotiated agreements
between source and affected states is equally dim. Therefore, down-
stream states must rely on whatever relief federal and affected state
legislation and administrative regulation afford.
A. Federal Common Law
Early this century, the Supreme Court held that downstream states
could protect themselves against intrusions from out-of-state pollution
by resorting to federal common law. In Missouri v. Illinois,13 Missouri
alleged that Chicago's plans to discharge its sewage into a river that
flowed into the Mississippi River would convert the latter "from a pure
stream into a polluted and poisoned ditch." 4 Noting the absence of an
explicit constitutional bar to the defendant's conduct, 5 Justice
12. See infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text (discussing alternative remedies
for downstream states).
13. 200 U.S. 496 (1906). Five years earlier, the Court refused to grant the city of
Chicago's request for a demurrer to Missouri's bill of complaint. Missouri v. Illinois,
180 U.S. 208, 248 (1901).
14. 200 U.S. at 518. The two rivers joined at a point about 43 miles north of St.
Louis. 180 U.S. at 211.
15. 200 U.S. at 519.
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Holmes failed to identify the source of Missouri's legal rights. Never-
theless, it later became apparent that the Court's holding recognized
the existence of a body of federal common law applicable to interstate
water pollution disputes.16 The Court indicated its willingness to af-
ford relief when pollution generated in one state caused injury in an-
other, but required that the case "be of serious magnitude, clearly and
fully proved." 17 In the Court's view, Missouri failed to satisfy this
standard. 
1 8
The next year, in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,19 Justice Holmes
elaborated on the extent of a state's right to be free of pollution gener-
ated in another state. Holmes characterized Georgia's suit against a
Tennessee copper plant that discharged sulfur dioxide as one "for an
injury to [Georgia] in its capacity of quasi-sovereign" to protect the
state's interest "in all the earth and air within its domain.",20 Satisfied
that the pollution threatened damage to forests, vegetation, and per-
haps the health of Georgia residents,21 the Court enjoined the company
from operating, except in compliance with specified emission
limitations.22
16. See generally Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Rem-
edies for Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 152-55 (1985) (discussing the early federal
common law in interstate pollution cases); Michael Collins, Comment, The Dilemma of
the Downstream State: The Untimely Demise of Federal Common Law Nuisance, 11
B.C. ENvrL. AFr. L. REv. 295, 311-20 (1984); Maria V. Maurrasse, Comment,
Oklahoma v. EPA: Does the Clean Water Act Provide an Effective Remedy to Down-
stream States or Is There Room Left for Federal Common Law?, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1137, 1143-45 (1991). See also Calvin R. Dexter & Teresa J. Schwarzenbart, Note, City
of Milwaukee v. Illinois: The Demise of the Federal Common Law of Water Pollution,
1982 Wis. L. REv. 627 (discussing the application of federal common law to an inter-
state pollution case).
17. 200 U.S. at 521.
18. Id. at 526.
19. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
20. Id. at 237. The court added:
When the States by their union made the forcible abatement of outside nuisances
impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to whatever might be
done. They did not renounce the possibility of making reasonable demands on the
ground of their still remaining quasi-sovereign interests; and the alternative to
force is a suit in this court.
Id.
21. Id. at 238-39.
22. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915), modified, 240 U.S. 650
(1916). In subsequent years, the Court reaffirmed a state's right to bring suit within the
Court's original jurisdiction to abate interstate pollution that threatened the health or
property of its citizens. See, e.g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 302 (1921).
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A 1971 appellate court opinion purported to clarify any remaining
questions about the source of the law applicable to interstate water pol-
lution disputes. In Texas v. Pankey,23 the Tenth Circuit interpreted
Tennessee Copper as establishing that each state's entry into the Union
guaranteed it federal protection from pollution caused by outside
sources.24 Federal common law principles established and provided
remedies for this "quasi-sovereign ecological right."'25
The next year the Supreme Court cited Pankey as the source of the
"controlling principle" in a suit by Illinois to abate a public nuisance
caused by Milwaukee's discharge of sewage into Lake Michigan. In
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee26 (Milwaukee 1), the Court declared that
federal common law was available to protect a state's ecological
rights.27 The Court premised these federal common law principles,
which protected the state's "quasi-sovereign" ecological rights, on the
need for a uniform rule of decision to govern the allocation of interstate
The Court required states to prove "by clear and convincing evidence," the need for
relief. Id. at 309. In New York v. New Jersey, the plaintiff failed to meet this burden
because the addition of New Jersey sewage into the already polluted New York Bay did
not make the situation sufficiently worse to justify an injunction. Id. at 309-10, 312-13.
But see New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931) (finding that New York's dis-
charge of garbage into the Atlantic Ocean constituted a public nuisance on New Jersey
beaches and requiring New York to incinerate its garbage).
23. 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971).
24. Id. at 240 (citing Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)).
Each state's entry into the Union "inherently insured or guaranteed to it a right of
protection by a federal court against improper pollution or impairment by outside
sources of its appropriate environment and resource conditions." Id.
25. At the time of Tennessee Copper, the need for and existence of federal common
law had not yet been recognized, so "it was only natural that the court should then deal
with the question before it [Le., the source of Georgia's rights] upon the indefinite basis
that it did." Id. It subsequently became clear that "the ecological rights of a State in
the improper impairment of them from sources outside the State's own territory" would
be grounded in federal common law. Id.
Federal common law and not the varying common law of the individual States is,
we think, entitled and necessary to be recognized as a basis for dealing in uniform
standard with the environmental rights of a State against improper impairment by
sources outside its domain .... [O]nly a federal common law basis can provide an
adequate means for dealing with such claims as alleged federal rights.
Id. at 241.
26. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
27. Id. at 99-100. "When we deal with air and water in their ambient or interstate
aspects, there is a federal common law." Id. at 103. The Court held that this federal
common law of nuisance provided a proper basis for federal question jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 99.
1993]
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waters.2" For the time being,2 9 federal common law permitted states
with high water-quality standards to impose those strict standards on
other states. 0
Five months after the decision in Milwaukee I, however, Congress
adopted the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (FWPCA).1 Nine years later the Supreme Court returned to the
issue in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee 11).32 Basing its con-
clusion primarily upon the "comprehensive" character of the new stat-
ute's program for eliminating water pollution,33 the Supreme Court
held that these amendments deprived the federal courts of the author-
ity to impose more stringent limitations than those imposed by EPA or
the states under the CWA. 34 As a result, unless the 1972 amendments
28. Id. at 105 n.6 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-
27 (1963)). The Court also relied on the fact that "Congress has evinced increasing
concern with the quality of the aquatic environment as it affects the conservation and
safeguarding of fish and wildlife resources." Id. at 102. For a discussion of the func-
tions the federal common law serves in resolving interstate pollution disputes, see Ken-
neth M. Murchison, Interstate Pollution: The Need for Federal Common Law, 6 VA. J.
NAT. RESOURCES L. 1 (1986).
29. The Court speculated that "[it may happen that new federal laws and new
federal regulations may in time preempt the field of federal common law of nuisance."
406 U.S. at 107.
30. Id.
31. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1988)). Although the current CWA is sometimes still referred to as the
FWPCA, the term CWA has been the name used most frequently since 1977. See infra
notes 79-98 and accompanying text (discussing the history and provisions of the CWA).
32. 451 U.S. 304 (1981). The case was a continuation of Milwaukee I, discussed at
supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. Following the Court's decision in that case,
the district court found that Illinois proved the existence of a federal common law nui-
sance and ordered Milwaukee to eliminate sewer overflows and achieve specified effluent
limitations on treated sewage. 451 U.S. at 311-12. The court of appeals reversed the
effluent limitations as applied to treated sewage but upheld the rest of the district court's
order. Id. at 321-24.
33. 405 U.S. at 317-19. The Court concluded that Congress had "occupied the field
through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an
expert administrative agency." Id. at 317. For a fuller treatment of Milwaukee II, see
Glicksman, supra note 16, at 159-7 1. Shortly thereafter, the Court expanded its holding
beyond the factual parameters of Milwaukee II when it ruled that "the federal common
law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely preempted by the more compre-
hensive scope of the [1972 CWA]." Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clanmners Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 22 (1981). Federal common law, as applied to ocean
pollution, was preempted by the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1988). 453 U.S. at 11.
34. 451 U.S. at 320. Similarly, the Court held that the district court lacked the
power to order Milwaukee to eliminate sewer overflows. Id. at 321-24.
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left state common law remedies intact, a question the Court refused to
address in Milwaukee II," the CWA's remedies constituted the only
legal weapons available to states seeking abatement of interstate water
pollution.
B. State Common Law
The Supreme Court addressed the impact of the 1972 amendments
on state common law remedies in International Paper Co. v. Ouel-
lette.36 The Court held that, in considering a state law claim concern-
ing interstate water pollution subject to the CWA, a court must apply
the law of the source state; the CWA preempted the common law of the
receiving state.3 7 Although the ultimate goal of both federal and state
law is to eliminate water pollution, 38 application of the common law of
the receiving state "circumvents the [federal] permit system, thereby
upsetting the balance of public and private interests addressed by the
Act."3 9 Furthermore, the failure to preempt state law undermines "the
important goals of efficiency and predictability in the permit system,"
and creates a "chaotic regulatory structure"' in which a point source
could be subject to the multiple, varied, and often indeterminate com-
mon laws of the downstream states.41 Congress intended to permit
35. Id. at 310 n.4.
36. 479 U.S. 481 (1987). Several lower federal and state courts previously ad-
dressed that issue. In a continuation of the litigation between Illinois and Milwaukee,
the Seventh Circuit held that the CWA precluded the application of one state's common
law against a pollution source located in another state. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985). Application of the
affected state's common law interfered with the CWA's carefully devised regulatory
scheme. Id. at 414. But the Act did not preempt suits alleging violations of the com-
mon law of the source state. Id. at 413-14. The Tennessee Supreme Court agreed, and
reversed an appellate court decision to the contrary. Tennessee v. Champion Int'l
Corp., 709 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. 1986), rev'g 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1338, 1342 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1985), vacated, 479 U.S. 1061 (1987).
37. 479 U.S. at 486, 492-96.
38. Id. at 494.
39. Id. In particular, applying the receiving state's common law to an interstate
dispute would disrupt the "balance of interests" struck by EPA in devising effluent
limitations and by the source state in issuing a § 1342 permit. Id. at 495.
40. Quoting the Seventh Circuit's decision in the Milwaukee litigation, the Court
determined that permitting the receiving state to apply its own common law "would
lead to a chaotic confrontation between sovereign states." Id. at 497 (quoting Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d at 414).
41. 479 U.S. at 497. Despite its quotation of the following portion of the legislative
history, the Court appeared to ignore its import: "[I]f damages could be shown, other
1993]
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source states to influence pollution regulation, while affording affected
states only an advisory role in regulating pollution originating outside
their borders.42 The Court concluded that individuals harmed by in-
terstate pollution could bring suit alleging violations of the source
state's nuisance laws, and could even file such suits in the courts of the
affected state.43
Although Ouellette preserved the right of affected states, as well as
others injured by interstate pollution, to seek redress under the com-
mon law of the source state, resort to source state common law in this
context may be problematic.' Litigation premised on common law
causes of action historically has proven insufficient to provide an effec-
tive deterrent to pollution.45 Even if an individual suffers sufficient in-
jury to establish standing to sue,46 for example, he or she often lacks a
sufficient stake in the matter to finance the litigation alone, and high
transaction costs may prevent agreement among potential multiple
plaintiffs to pay for the suit. In addition, even if a plaintiff manages to
remedies [in addition to a citizen suit under 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988)] would remain
available. Compliance with requirements under this act would not be a defense to a
common law action for pollution damages." S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
3746-47 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3746, cited in International Pa-
per Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 493 n.13. This statement indicates Congress' intent
that predictability give way, at least in certain cases, to the goal of remedying the dam-
age caused by water pollution.
42. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 490. The Court stated: "[T]hus the Act makes it clear
that affected States occupy a subordinate position to source States in the federal regula-
tory program." Id. at 491. The Court referred to the notice and comment opportuni-
ties afforded by 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a)(2), 1342(b)(5) as alternative avenues for affected
states to pursue complaints against source state polluters. Id. at 489-90.
43. 479 U.S. at 497, 501-02.
44. Cf. Maurrasse, supra note 16, at 1180 (stating that the decisions in Milwaukee
II and Ouellette "continue to leave downstream states without an effective means of
protecting their environmental integrity").
45. See JOHN E. BONINE & THOMAS 0. MCGARiTY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMEN-
TAL PROTECTION 215 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the inadequacies of common law en-
forcement); N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink" Public Regulation of Water
Quality - Part I. State Pollution Control Programs, 52 IOWA L. REv. 186, 196-201
(1966) (discussing inadequacies of private remedies).
46. A plaintiff in a private nuisance action typically must demonstrate that the de-
fendant's activities caused a substantial interference with the plaintiff's protected prop-
erty interests. See Robert L. Glicksman, A Guide to Kansas Common Law Actions
Against Industrial Pollution Sources, 33 KAN. L. REv. 621, 634-35 (1985). A plaintiff
in a public nuisance action satisfies the "special injury" requirement by proving that the
harm he or she suffered is distinguishable from that suffered by other members of the
public. Id.
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accumulate the resources necessary to file suit, it is difficult to link the
damage suffered to any particular defendant.47 Perhaps even more im-
portantly, private litigation is too haphazard to provide a coordinated
or comprehensive program of pollution control.4" Because it is pre-
mised on the adversary process characteristic of the Anglo-American
legal system, private litigation tends to represent inadequately the pub-
lic interest in matters concerning pollution control.49 The shortcom-
ings of the common law as a means of combatting pollution persuaded
Congress to establish legislative standards in the 1970's.
The potential for biased or inequitable applications of the law which
is inherent in the interstate context exacerbates these difficulties. States
involved in interstate pollution disputes obviously have conflicting in-
terests. The upstream state wishes to resolve the dispute by imposing
the fewest possible restrictions on its dischargers, so as to minimize the
economic impact. It may do so by ignoring the adverse effects that its
discharges into interstate waters have on affected state interests when
determining appropriate levels of pollution control.50 The downstream
state is likely to wish to protect its natural resource base, as well as the
public health, by setting strict controls on upstream polluters. 51
The standards applicable to the resolution of nuisance and other po-
tentially applicable tort causes of action are indeterminate and open-
ended. 52 As a result, the courts in a common law action involving in-
terstate pollution possess considerable freedom to manipulate doctrinal
47. See Hines, supra note 45, at 197-98.
48. Id. at 200-01. The author states:
An effective program of pollution control measures requires that the control
agency possess considerable expertise in the area of regulation and that it have the
capacity to plan ahead for anticipated problems. Courts manifestly are not en-
dowed with either of these features .... Courts are simply not equipped for the
surveillance, the policing and the preventive activities required for efficient pollu-
tion abatement.
Id.
49. Id. at 201.
50. In other words, the source state externalizes the environmental costs of dis-
charges into interstate waters by refusing either to limit discharges by industries operat-
ing within the source state or to impose liability upon those industries for harms caused
in the affected state.
51. The affected state desires to externalize the economic costs incurred through
efforts to prevent the downstream adverse effects that result from upstream pollution.
52. The tests in a majority of jurisdictions that govern both liability and remedial
issues involve a balancing of interests. See generally, Glicksman, supra note 46, at 631-
50.
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principles to reach a result favorable to the interests of the forum state.
If suit is brought in the upstream state, avoiding the appearance of bias
in favor of source state dischargers is difficult. Conversely, polluters
subjected to the decrees of an affected state court may cry foul.53 De-
spite the fact that the courts must apply the common law of the source
state no matter where suit is brought, both sides of the controversy will
be inclined to seek the most favorable forum. 4 For these reasons
many commentators insist that applying federal, not state law, best re-
solves controversies stemming from interstate spillovers. 55 In sum, re-
sort to source state common law appears to provide neither a
comprehensive nor an equitable means for the resolution of interstate
water pollution disputes.5 6
C. Source State Regulation
Although source state statutes and administrative regulations pro-
vide an additional outlet for affected states injured by out-of-state pol-
lution, that body of law is likely to prove just as unsatisfactory as
53. Cf. Murchison, supra note 28, at 32 (stating that if the law of either the up-
stream or downstream state prevails, that state gets an unjustifiable preference for its
interests, while the other state is denied access to an impartial tribunal).
54. Id. at 39-40.
55. See, e.g., William A. Butler, The "New Federalism"- Can It Really Work in
Implementing Environmental Statutes?, 12 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 15,095,
15,096 (1982) (arguing that federal statutes are required to resolve interstate environ-
mental problems because "states are either unable or unwilling to solve the particular
environmental problem"); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term -
Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 14 (1975) (concluding
that an acceptable accommodation of interstate interests dictates that the Supreme
Court possess the power to fashion substantive law not tied to that of any state); Rich-
ard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Im-
plementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1264 (1977)
("[S]pillover effects among the states create the strongest justification for federal
intervention.").
56. See also Murchison, supra note 28, at 39 (arguing that common law causes of
action, such as nuisance law, are vague and subject to manipulation); Maurrasse, supra
note 16, at 1157 (stating that discharger probably complies with source state's laws,
allowing issuance of permit despite noncompliance with affected state laws). The Ouel-
lette Court's preservation of source state common law, however, provides some degree
of protection to affected states. The common law of nuisance is similar from state to
state; therefore, the level of protection provided by source state law may equal that
provided by affected state law. Moreover, given the vagueness of nuisance law and the
ability of courts to manipulate it, the ability of affected state plaintiffs to sue in their
own courts appears to reduce the possibility that a court biased against the affected state
plaintiff will twist the law to favor a source state defendant.
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source state common law. The CWA preserves state authority to adopt
controls more stringent than those required by federal law.57 A source
state may impose such controls on one of its own point sources, thus
preventing adverse effects in a downstream state. The source state,
however, is unlikely to adopt discharge restrictions that primarily ben-
efit affected states. The source state has every incentive to secure for its
own residents the economic benefits attributable to the operation of its
industries, while seeking to foist upon neighboring states the environ-
mental costs of those industrial operations. 8 As the Supreme Court
recognized in some of its dormant Commerce Clause cases,5 9 "to the
extent that the burden of state regulation falls on interests outside the
state, it is unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those political
restraints normally exerted when interests within the state are af-
fected. ' '6° Any environmental burden borne only by the downstream
party is likely to receive minimal consideration from the political pro-
cess of the source state, in which out-of-state environmental concerns
will tend to be underrepresented when compared to the source state's
industrial interests. Consequently, reliance by affected states on source
state regulation as a bulwark against out-of-state pollution is ill-
advised.
57. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1988).
58. Upstream state legislators typically ignore the interests of out-of-state victims in
setting standards because, unlike polluters, who tend to be effective lobbyists, these vic-
tims lack effective representation in the legislative process of the source state. See
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common
Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REv. 875, 891 n.74 (1991). The
authors add that "[this risk of political favoritism towards local firms is traditionally a
rationale for federal court intervention under the dormant commerce clause." Id. (cit-
ing Cass Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689,
1705-08 (1984)). See also Dale D. Goble, The Compact Clause and Transboundary
Problems: "A Federal Remedy for the Disease Most Incident to A Federal Government",
17 ENVTL. L. 785, 787 (1987) ("Because of their geographically limited political respon-
sibility, states are unlikely to restrict the conduct of their citizens to benefit the citizens
of another state. Out-of-state individuals cannot make their preferences known through
the local political market.").
59. Courts interpret the Constitution's affirmative grant to Congress of the power to
regulate interstate commerce, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, as a limit on the authority of the
states to interfere with such commerce. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 403-41 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining the general history of the
dormant Commerce Clause).
60. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767-68 n.2 (1945). See also South
Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85 n.2 (1938)
(state regulations that burden those out of the state for the benefit of those within con-
flict with the Commerce Clause).
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D. Interstate Agreements
Voluntarily negotiated agreements among source and affected states
present an alternative to the application of legal compulsion in resolv-
ing interstate pollution disputes.61 In limited contexts, states have exe-
cuted agreements to combat pollution of interstate waters.62 However,
as Richard Stewart points out, bargaining between states is unlikely to
resolve disputes over interstate pollution for three reasons. 63 First, up-
stream states enjoy a decisive (and unfair) negotiating advantage be-
cause the status quo (continued interstate pollution) favors them.6
Second, when spillovers are widespread and involve many parties,
transaction costs may block agreements.65 Third, in large part as a
result of the first two factors, strategic bargaining may thwart
agreements. 6
Even when interstate compacts are executed successfully, implemen-
tation and enforcement is difficult. Disputes concerning the sharing of
burdens often lead to dissolution of the compact.67 For example, re-
61. The Compact Clause authorizes compacts between states with congressional
consent. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The CWA encourages compacts among the
states for the control of water pollution. 33 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1988).
62. See, eg., 1987 Chesapeake Bay Agreement of the Chesapeake Executive Coun-
cil (Dec. 15, 1987) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2100 (Michie 1989)). See gener-
ally Paul D. Barker, Jr., Comment, The Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act: The Problem
with State Regulation of Interstate Resources, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 735 (1990)
(calling for the Chesapeake Bay states and EPA to begin implementing environmental
protection measures). See also Goble, supra note 58.
63. See Richard B. Stewart, Interstate Resource Conflicts: The Role of the Federal
Courts, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 241, 243 n.15 (1982) (arguing that bargaining among
states is a poor mechanism for resolving interstate disputes because upstream states
enjoy an advantage in negotiations). See also Stewart, supra note 55, at 1216 (bargain-
ing among states to minimize losses caused by interstate pollution is costly and "may do
little to improve the lot of states in a weak position (such as those in a downwind or
downstream location).").
64. Stewart, Interstate Resource Conflicts, supra note 63, at 243 n.15.
65. Id. See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and
Administrative Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. Prrr. L. REV.
607, 649 (1985) ("[Ihe transaction costs of mutually beneficial agreements between
states are prohibitive in the case of most actual geographic spillovers," because in most
cases the spillover occurs in several states, and the amount of the spillover effect in each
state is subject to uncertainty.).
66. Stewart, Interstate Resource Conflicts, supra note 63, at 243 n.15.
67. See generally Dan M. Berkovitz, Waste Wars: Did Congress "Nuke" State Sover-
eignty in the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985?, 11 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 437 (1987) (describing political attempts between states to negotiate
changes in low-level radioactive waste disposal under the LLRWPAA).
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cent efforts to negotiate an interstate compact to resolve the shortage of
disposal capacity for low-level radioactive waste have been highly con-
tentious and represent less than a resounding success story.68 it ap-
pears unwise to place undue emphasis on the compact mechanism for
resolving problems arising from interstate pollution.
E. Federal and Affected State Regulation
Given the unavailability or inadequacy of source state common law,
source state regulatory remedies, and negotiated agreements between
states as a means of protecting downstream state water quality, affected
states must rely primarily on the application of their own statutes and
administrative regulations or on the interstate dispute resolution mech-
anisms contained in the CWA. This section traces the development of
federal water pollution legislation and describes the extent to which it
authorizes the application of affected state regulation to interstate
conflicts.
1. The Development of Federal Legislation
Beginning in 1948, Congress periodically supplemented the common
law remedies then available to affected states. Congress enacted legis-
lation that established and later refined an administrative structure for
controlling interstate water pollution.69 The FWPCA,7 ° adopted in
1948, proved to be limited in both scope and utility.7 1 Although it
68. Id. See also, E. William Colglazier & Mary K. English, Low-Level Radioactive
Waste: Can New Disposal Sites Be Found?, 53 TENN. L. RFv. 621 (1986) (discussing the
difficulty of finding new dump sites for low-level radioactive waste).
69. As indicated above, the Supreme Court ultimately interpreted that legislation as
reflecting Congress' intent to eliminate access to the federal common law remedies pre-
viously available and to affected state common law remedies. See supra notes 31-43 and
accompanying text (discussing preemptive effect of federal legislation).
70. Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).
71. For a description of the 1948 Act and its weaknesses, see William L. Andreen,
Beyond Words of Exhortation: The Congressional Prescription for Vigorous Federal En-
forcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 202, 210-15 (1987) (discuss-
ing specific problems with federal regulation); Jeffrey M. Gaba, Federal Supervision of
State Water Quality Standards Under the Clean Water Act, 36 VAND. L. REv. 1167,
1177-80 (1983) (describing federal strategies for curbing water pollution); Stephen J.
Bushong, Note, Upstream Pollution and Downstream Problems: Oklahoma v. EPA
Makes A Splash in Interstate Water Pollution Disputes, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 233, 236-
37 (1992) (suggesting that the 1948 Act was so ineffective that no law suits were ever
filed under its provisions); Maurrasse, supra note 16, at 1146-48 (describing federal
strategies for curbing water pollution).
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nominally authorized the federal regulation of interstate (but only in-
terstate) waters, it restricted federal enforcement authority to those sit-
uations in which a particular pollution source endangered the health or
welfare of persons in a state other than the discharging state.72 The
government found it "extraordinarily difficult ' 73 to prove such an en-
dangerment, and as a result, the legislation failed to deter water pollu-
tion.74 Congress amended the Act in 1965, 7 requiring states to adopt
water quality standards and implementation plans for all interstate wa-
ters within their jurisdiction.76 The amended Act also authorized
abatement of discharges that reduced the quality of interstate waters.7 7
As a practical matter, however, the requirement that the government
trace impaired water quality to a particular source precluded federal
enforcement.78
72. See Andreen, supra note 71, at 211; Gaba, supra note 71, at 1177 (citing 33
U.S.C. § 1151(2)(d) (1948)); Maurrasse, supra note 16, at 1146-48. In addition, the
federal government could not sue the state in which the discharge took place without
the latter's consent. See also Frank V. Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provi-
sions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing
Effective Legislation, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1103 (1970) (noting that the FWPCA provided
little incentive for local officials to consent to abatement actions). This veto power was
eliminated in the 1956 amendments to the Act. Andreen, supra note 71, at 212 (citing
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 84-660, 70 Stat. 498 (1956)).
73. Gaba, supra note 71, at 1179.
74. See Andreen, supra note 71, at 212.
75. Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965) (superseded
1972).
76. See Andreen, supra note 71, at 213; Gaba, supra note 71, at 1178 (citing 33
U.S.C. § 466g(c) (Supp. IV 1965-1968)). These standards became applicable to inter-
state waters only after the federal government determined that they protected the public
health and welfare and enhanced water quality. See Gaba, supra note 71, at 1178 (cit-
ing 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c)(l)-(3) (Supp. IV 1965-1968)). Although the federal government
could issue water quality standards for interstate waters when the states declined to
issue acceptable standards, the promulgation process was lengthy and cumbersome. See
Andreen, supra note 71, at 213; Maurrasse, supra note 16, at 1147.
77. See Gaba, supra note 71, at 1178.
78. "It was often impossible to estimate with any degree of precision the impact of
any one discharger on a body of water. Enforcement authorities lacked the scientific
data on which to base sanctions against alleged violators." Steven Gaynor, Comment,
The Dilemma of the Downstream Plaintiff in an Interstate Water Pollution Case, 37
BUFF. L. REV. 257, 264 (1988) (citing M. WARD, THE CLEAN WATER ACT: THE SEC-
OND DECADE 19 (1982); ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, AIR AND WATER POL-
LUTION CONTROL LAW: 1982, at 359-60 (1982)). See also EPA v. California ex rel
State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202-03 (1976); S. REP. No. 414, 92d
Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLU-
TION CONTROL AT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1423 (1973); Andreen, supra note 71,
at 214 (noting that the enforcement mechanism was "slow" and contained "other weak-
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The 1972 amendments to the FWPCA7 9 created the basic regulatory
structure that exists today. These amendments introduced a series of
technology-based effluent limitations, ° made applicable to individual
point sources through the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit program."1 The water quality standards that
formed the core of the earlier legislation were relegated to the back-
ground. 2 Under the current CWA, 3 water quality standards function
in effect as a safety net for bodies of water that the technology-based
standards do not adequately protect.8 4 The CWA requires each state to
designate the desired use of each body of water within its jurisdiction,
derive pollutant concentration limits necessary to protect that use, cal-
culate a maximum daily discharge load based on the assimilative ca-
pacity of the receiving body of water, and allocate that load among all
point sources discharging into that body of water.8 5 Individual dis-
chargers must comply with these load allocations to the extent they are
more stringent than applicable technology-based effluent limitations.
2. The CWA's Interstate Pollution Provisions
The CWA includes several provisions relevant to the resolution of
interstate pollution disputes.8 6 The most important substantive provi-
nesses"); Gaba, supra note 71, at 1179 (noting that the proof necessary to show a viola-
tion of the water quality standards contained in the 1965 Act was merely "very hard" to
compile in comparison to the standard of proof necessary under the 1948 Act, which
was "extraordinarily difficult").
79. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816 (1972).
80. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1988).
81. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (establishing the permit system and specifying procedures to
obtain a permit).
82. Id. § 1313.
83. Congress amended the FWPCA again in 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat.
1567 (1977), when the Act became known as the CWA. Congress enacted the most
recent amendments in 1987. Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 60 (1987).
84. For example, technology-based standards may be insufficient in a situation in
which numerous point sources discharging large amounts of pollutants are located
along a single body of water with a relatively low assimilative capacity. In this situa-
tion, water may remain polluted even if each point source complies with the technology-
based effluent limitations.
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)-(d) (1988). The amendments also imposed monitoring and
reporting requirements that aid enforcement by streamlining the procedures. See An-
dreen, supra note 71, at 217. Enforcement of water quality standards under the Act is
no longer limited to instances where public health is endangered. Id.
86. This section provides an overview of the interstate pollution provisions at issue
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sions preserve state authority to adopt pollution controls that are more
stringent than those contained in the EPA's technology-based stan-
dards.8 7 The CWA conditions the grant of a permit on compliance
with the more stringent state controls necessary to implement "applica-
ble" state water quality standards.88 Arkansas v. Oklahoma 9 raised
the issue of whether an affected state's water quality standards are "ap-
plicable" to an upstream point source.
A similar issue arises under the provisions of the Act which afford
affected states procedural opportunities to object to the issuance of per-
mits to upstream dischargers. These mechanisms for affected state par-
ticipation in the permit process differ, depending upon whether EPA or
the source state is the permit-issuing authority.' When a point source
applies to EPA for a permit, it must provide certification from the state
in which the discharge originates that the discharge will comply with
"applicable" provisions of the Act,91 including those relating to state
water quality standards.92 If the discharge may affect the quality of
water in another state, EPA must notify that state of the pending per-
mit application. If that state determines that the discharge violates its
water quality standards, the state may request a hearing before EPA.9 3
EPA must condition the permit to insure compliance with "applicable
water quality requirements."94
A state authorized by EPA to issue CWA permits must insure that
any state whose waters may be affected by issuance of a permit has the
chance to submit recommendations to the permit-issuing state.9 5 If the
in Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992). See infra notes 156-77 and accompa-
nying text for more detailed analysis of these provisions.
87. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1988).
88. Id. §§ 1342(a)(1), 1311(b)(1)(C).
89. 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992).
90. Either EPA or a state that submitted an acceptable permit program to EPA
administers the NPDES permit program applicable to point sources. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(a)-(b) (1988). The statute prohibits the discharge of pollutants except in compli-
ance with a properly issued permit. Id. § 1311(a); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct.
1046, 1054 (1992). A state lacks the authority necessary to regulate a point source that
is located in another state through issuance or denial of a permit to such a point source.
See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. 805, 811 (1987).
91. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1988).
92. Id. § 1313.
93. Id. § 1341(a)(2).
94. Id.
95. Id. § 1342(b)(5).
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permitting state rejects those recommendations, it must notify both the
affected state and EPA.9 6 This provision fails to indicate, however,
whether either the affected state or EPA may force the permit issuer to
condition the permit on compliance with the affected state's standards.
The Act also authorizes a state to sue EPA if the agency fails to
enforce an effluent limitation, the violation of which either adversely
affects public health or welfare in that state or causes a violation of any
water quality requirement in that state. 97 Whether an affected state
may employ this remedy to force compliance with its own water qual-
ity standards or only to force compliance with source state standards is
not clear.
9 8
Despite a variety of substantive and procedural provisions aimed at
the control of interstate pollution, then, the CWA does not indicate
definitively whether a downstream state may insist that source state
dischargers comply with its water quality standards. Prior to Arkansas
v. Oklahoma, several courts determined that it may, but none of these
cases was dispositive of the issue.99 EPA took the position that the
96. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
97. Id. § 1365(h).
98. See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text for further discussion of this
provision.
99. In Champion Int'l Corp. v. EPA, 648 F. Supp. 1390 (W.D.N.C. 1987), the dis-
trict court concluded that EPA properly objected to a permit that North Carolina is-
sued to an in-state point source. Id. at 1395-96. The permit failed to require
compliance with Tennessee's water quality standards. The court ruled that "[a]n
NPDES permit that does not contain conditions adequate to achieve state water quality
standards approved under [CWA § 1313] is outside the requirements" of both the CWA
and EPA regulations. Id. at 1394-95 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(1)). When North
Carolina requested withdrawal of the decision, the court refused, even after the
Supreme Court's decision in Ouellette. Champion Int'l Corp. v. EPA, 652 F. Supp.
1387 (W.D.N.C. 1987). It reasoned that nothing in Ouellette indicated that EPA lacks
the discretion to review state-issued permits to determine whether they will have an
undue impact on interstate waters. Id. at 1399. The court added: "An affected state's
water standards are obviously relevant to a determination that the discharge would have
an undue impact on interstate waters. To hold otherwise would be to thwart the pur-
poses of the CWA generally and the interstate dispute provisions." Id. at 1399-1400
(citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 123.44(c)(2)). In the court's view, EPA's
review of the North Carolina factor might have been arbitrary and capricious had the
agency failed to consider this "relevant" factor. Id. at 1400. On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit vacated the district court's judgment on procedural grounds. Champion Int'l
Corp. v. EPA, 850 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1988). The Fourth Circuit concluded that it was
premature to review the merits of the EPA's objections to the North Carolina permit.
Id. at 187. Prior to Champion, another court stated in dictum that an affected state
may block the issuance of a permit to an upstream point source "until conditions are
imposed insuring compliance with applicable water quality requirements of the ob-
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CWA requires upstream point sources to comply with downstream
water quality standards. In 1973, the EPA's first regulations imple-
menting the NPDES permit program declared that "[n]o permit shall
be issued where... the imposition of conditions cannot insure compli-
ance with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected
States. ' '"" ° The regulations in effect at the time of Arkansas v.
Oklahoma were substantially similar. They required that both EPA
and state-issued permits include conditions that "conform to applicable
water quality requirements under § 1341(a)(2) of the CWA when the
discharge affects a State other than the certifying State."' '
F. Summary
In Milwaukee II and Ouellette, the Supreme Court held that the
CWA preempted the application to interstate water pollution disputes
of both the federal common law of nuisance and the common law of
the affected state. Although the Act preserves affected state access to
source state common law and legislation, neither is likely to provide
effective redress to affected states.1 02 Due to inequality of bargaining
position and the barriers attributable to transaction costs, negotiated
agreements among source and affected states hold little promise as a
comprehensive solution.103 The ability of affected states to stem the
flow of out-of-state contamination thus depends primarily upon the
CWA's interstate pollution provisions and the statutes and administra-
tive regulations of affected states. The manner in which those provi-
sions apply to an interstate pollution dispute was the focus of Arkansas
v. Oklahoma.
jecting state." Montgomery Envtl. Coalition v. Costle, 646 F.2d 568, 594 n.21 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
100. 40 C.F.R. § 125.21(b), quoted in 38 Fed. Reg. 13,528, 13,533 (1973).
101. 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(4) (1990). Cf. id. § 131.10(b) ("[I]n designating uses of
a water body and the appropriate criteria for those uses, the State shall take into consid-
eration the water quality standards of downstream waters and shall ensure that its water
quality standards provide for the attainment and maintenance of the water quality stan-
dards of downstream waters.").
102. See supra notes 44-60 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
problems states have in employing these remedies.
103. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (discussing the competing inter-
ests of source and affected states).
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II. ARKANSAS V OKLAHOMA
A. Administrative Proceedings
In 1985, the city of Fayetteville, Arkansas applied to EPA for an
NPDES permit"° for the city's new municipal wastewater treatment
plant. The city proposed to discharge treated wastewater into Mud
Creek, a tributary of the Illinois River, at a point thirty-nine miles up-
stream from the Arkansas-Oklahoma border. Oklahoma designated
the portion of the river nearest to the Arkansas border as a state scenic
river.1 5 Despite Oklahoma's request to the contrary, the administra-
tive law judge (ALJ) issued the permit. 0 6 He determined that the cov-
ered discharges would not have an undue impact on water quality or
violate Oklahoma's water quality standards.1"7 On appeal, the Chief
Judicial Officer (CJO) remanded the case to the AUJ to determine
whether a preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that the per-
mitted discharge "would not cause an actual, detectable violation of
Oklahoma's [water quality standards]."' 0 8 On remand, the ALJ issued
the permit because it would not result in any measurable violation of
these standards.1" This time, the CJO upheld the ALJ on appeal. The
CJO repeated, however, that "an out-of-state source must meet the
water quality standards of another downriver state," and that the Fay-
etteville plant must comply with Oklahoma's water quality standards
as they exist at the border of the two states. 110
B. The Tenth Circuit's Decision
Both states appealed.111 Oklahoma argued that EPA erred in con-
cluding that discharges under the permit would not violate its water
104. At the time of the city's application for the permit from EPA, Arkansas had
not received federal approval to operate its own permit program pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b) (1988). See Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 598 (10th Cir. 1990).
105. 908 F.2d at 597-98. The river also had been proposed as a potential addition to
the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System. 16 U.S.C. § 1276(40) (1988). See 908
F.2d at 598.
106. 908 F.2d at 598.
107. Id. The permit contained effluent limitations on various pollutants and pro-
hibited the discharge of incompletely treated effluents into Mud Creek. Id.
108. Id. at 597, 603.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 603 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1988); 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.4(d),
122.44(d)(4); Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987)).
111. Jurisdiction was premised on 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F) (1988).
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quality standards.1 12 Arkansas challenged EPA's authority to require
compliance with Oklahoma's standards. 13 Contrary to Arkansas' po-
sition, EPA argued that the CWA requires compliance with state water
quality standards, regardless of the source of a discharge. 1 14
According to the Tenth Circuit, the ultimate issue was "whose water
quality standards take precedence under the Clean Water Act - the
upstream state's, the downstream state's, the federal government's or
nobody's."' 115 In other words, does the CWA require that any dis-
charge authorized by a permit comply with "all applicable water qual-
ity standards, including the EPA-approved regulations of any affected
downstream state"?116 The court found it crucial that EPA approved
of the stringent standards that accompanied Oklahoma's designation of
the Illinois River as a scenic river. As a result, the case did not involve
an attempt by one state to impose its standards on another. Rather,
the permit that EPA issued simply reflected the Act's mandate that
Fayetteville's discharges comply with federal law, Oklahoma's EPA-
approved water quality standards.117 Furthermore, the court deferred
to EPA's interpretation11 that Arkansas' construction of the Act
112. 908 F.2d at 601.
113. Id. According to Arkansas, the fundamental question was whether the CWA
requires a point source to comply with the water quality standards of all affected down-
stream states. Id.
114. Id. at 604 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.4(d), 122.44(d)(4), 131.10(b)).
115. Id. at 602. The issues in the case arose from the fact that "an upstream state
has the ability (if not the legal right) largely to control the quality of certain of the
waters of a downstream state." Id. If the upstream state's WQS [water quality stan-
dards] are less stringent than the downstream state's, "the lowest common denominator
will prevail." Id.
116. Id. The issue, as framed by the court, begs the question. The Act requires that
dischargers comply with "applicable" water quality standards. The dispute surrounds
whether downstream water quality standards "apply" to an upstream point source.
117. 908 F.2d at 602. The court clarified its position:
[O]ne state may [not] directly regulate the conduct of a discharger in another state.
Such exercise of jurisdiction would exceed traditional bounds of sovereignty....
But the question posed here is whether federal law embodied in the Clean Water
Act requires a discharge permit to ensure compliance with the applicable WQS of
all affected states.
Id. at 604 n.9.
118. Id. at 604. Arkansas relied on statements from the Ouellette decision that
Congress intended affected states to play only an advisory role and that they could not
block issuance of permits to out-of-state sources. Id. at 607 (citing Ouellette, 479 U.S.
at 490). The court dismissed these statements as dicta. In contrast to Ouellette, which
was an enforcement case, this case involved permitting discharges in an upstream state.
In addition, Ouellette involved the application of affected state law, while this case in-
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made the achievement of downstream water quality standards "impos-
sible in many circumstances or... possible... only by imposing a
disproportionate burden on the dischargers located in the downstream
state."119
Having determined that EPA was correct in conditioning the city's
permit on compliance with Oklahoma's water quality standards, the
court addressed an issue none of the parties had raised - whether it
was appropriate for EPA to authorize a new discharge into a body of
water whose quality standards already were being violated.12 ° The
court held that, given the substantial evidence of ongoing violations of
the Illinois River water quality standards, EPA acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in issuing the permit.121 Relying on the CWA's stated pol-
icies, the court concluded that the Act prohibits the issuance of a per-
mit where applicable water quality standards already have been
violated. 1
22
The court also questioned the standard of proof that EPA imposed
on downstream states seeking to block the issuance of a permit to an
upstream point source. Once applicable water quality standards were
being violated, it was inappropriate to require a demonstration of the
incremental impact caused by a proposed additional discharge.
1 23
EPA acted arbitrarily when it issued the permit not only because it
failed to consider the existing violations of Oklahoma water quality
standards, but also because it misinterpreted and misapplied those
standards.124 The court found it unnecessary to remand to EPA be-
volved the application of federally approved water quality standards. Id. at 607-08.
The Supreme Court later relied on a similar distinction: Ouellette and Milwaukee II
involved state-issued permits, while Arkansas dealt with a federal permit. Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1054 (1992).
119. Id. at 606 (citing EPA Brief at 21).
120. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595 615-16 (10th Cir. 1990). Although the par-
ties failed to litigate this issue, the court indicated that the administrative record con-
tained substantial evidence of ongoing violations of Illinois River water quality
standards. Id. at 615.
121. Id. at 616, 630, 634.
122. Id. at 616, 620, 630-31 (citing Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 822
F.2d 104, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). "Common sense dictates that a pollution control strat-
egy designed to prevent, abate, and eliminate pollution would be subverted by allowing
a new source of pollution on a currently polluted watercourse." Id. at 631.
123. Id. at 632.
124. Id. at 615-16. Section 3, the "Anti-Degradation Policy" and section 5, "Bene-
ficial Use Limitation," demonstrated Oklahoma's intent to disallow any additional pol-
lution of a scenic river whose water quality standards were already degraded. Any
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cause even a correct interpretation and application of the Oklahoma
standards could not save the permit.
125
C. The Supreme Court's Decision
Justice Stevens' opinion for a unanimous Court framed the issue in
Arkansas v. Oklahoma as whether EPA satisfied its duty to protect the
interests of the downstream state by concluding that discharges from
the city's treatment plant did not cause a detectable violation of
Oklahoma's water quality standards.126 The Court held that it did.
127
The parties argued three analytically distinct questions. First, does
the CWA require EPA to apply the water quality standards of down-
stream states when issuing a permit to a point source in another state?
Second, even if the Act does not require the application of affected
state standards, does EPA possess the statutory authority to mandate
such compliance? Third, does the CWA prohibit the discharge of addi-
tional effluents into a body of water that already fails to meet water
quality standards?
The Court's answer to the second question made it neither necessary
nor prudent to resolve the first. EPA found that the statute and its
own regulations obligated it to ensure that Fayetteville's discharge did
not violate Oklahoma's standards, a conclusion which the Court
deemed "permissible and reasonable." 128 Because EPA had the discre-
tion to apply Oklahoma's standards to an Arkansas discharger, it was
unnecessary for the Court to determine whether the Act forced EPA to
mandate compliance with downstream standards. 129 In answering the
third question, the Court found no support for the appellate court's
interpretation of the statute. 30
The Court began its analysis of the second issue by citing EPA regu-
lations that, since 1973, prohibited EPA or a state from issuing a CWA
human-caused, detectable change in a water quality parameter of a scenic river, such as
turbidity or phosphorous, violates Oklahoma's requirements for water quality. Id. at
618.
125. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 620. The court found substantial evidence in
support of the AJ's finding that the water quality of the river had been degraded prior
to issuance of the permit. In these circumstances, EPA could not issue the permit. Id.
126. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1050-51 (1992).
127. Id. at 1051.
128. Id. at 1056.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1057.
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permit unless the permit "ensure[d] compliance with applicable water
quality requirements of all affected States."1 3' These regulations con-
stituted a reasonable exercise of EPA's discretion to establish condi-
tions for CWA permits.' 3 2 In addition, interstate application of state
water quality standards is consistent with the Act's broad purposes,
133
and achievement of these standards is one of the Act's central objec-
tives.134 Arkansas argued that the application of affected state stan-
dards to an upstream point source is inconsistent with Ouellette's
characterization of downstream states as "subordinate" players in the
CWA regulatory scheme. In response, the Court distinguished Ouel-
lette as a case that dealt with the appropriate limits on an affected
state's direct participation in permitting decisions. Arkansas v.
Oklahoma involved EPA's authority to require compliance with down-
stream water quality standards.' 35  The CWA attempts to balance
many competing policies and interests, and EPA's regulations are com-
patible with that balance.'
36
Turning to the third issue, the Court rejected the Tenth Circuit's
conclusion that the CWA prohibits additional discharges into waters
already in violation of water quality standards. According to the
Court, the Act contains provisions designed to remedy existing water
quality violations and to allocate the burden of reducing discharges be-
tween existing and new sources. 137 These provisions would be unnec-
essary if the Act barred new discharges into excessively polluted
waters. 1
38
The Court also repudiated the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that EPA
131. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. at 1056 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (1991);
id. § 122.44(d); 38 Fed. Reg. 13,533 (1973)). See supra note 100-01 and accompanying
text. The Court appeared to interpret the regulations to mean that the water quality
standards of all affected states are, by definition, "applicable" to a source state dis-
charger. 112 S. Ct. at 1057.
132. 112 S. Ct. at 1056-59.
133. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988)).
134. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (1988)).
135. Id. The Court found that the legislative history failed to demonstrate congres-
sional intent to preclude EPA from requiring compliance with downstream water qual-
ity standards as a prerequisite to the issuance of a permit. Id.
136. Id. at 1057.
137. 112 S. Ct. at 1058 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1988)).
138. Id. The Court speculated that the Tenth Circuit's ruling might be counter-
productive by "frustrat[ing] the construction of new plants that would improve existing
conditions." Id.
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misinterpreted Oklahoma's water quality standards. The Tenth Cir-
cuit interpreted the state's "Anti-Degradation Policy" to contain the
same categorical ban on new discharges into waters violating state
standards that it found implicit in the CWA. The Court disagreed, but
rejected the Tenth Circuit's conclusion on different grounds. The
Court concluded that the appellate court exceeded the legitimate scope
of judicial review of an agency adjudication.139 EPA's regulations ef-
fectively incorporate into federal law those water quality standards that
it determines to be "applicable." Therefore, EPA-approved state stan-
dards take effect as federal law in the interstate context. 14° Two fea-
tures of water pollution law supported this conclusion. First, the
Court cited the long history of federal law control of interstate water
pollution. 141 Second, treating state standards as federal law in the in-
terstate context is consistent with the Act's purpose of authorizing
EPA to create and manage "a uniform system of interstate water pollu-
tion regulation." 14
2
Having spent considerable effort reaching the less than startling con-
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1059 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (1991)). The Court declared that "the
system of federally approved standards as applied in the interstate context constitutes
federal law." Id. It is not clear whether the Court meant to imply that EPA-approved
standards, as applied to intrastate waters, are not part of federal law. The Act provides
no basis for such a distinction. A state's water quality standards must meet the require-
ments of the CWA, whether they apply to interstate or intrastate waters. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(c)(3)(1988). All such standards become "applicable" only upon EPA approval.
See id. Finally, one of the main purposes of the 1972 amendments was to extend the
coverage of the CWA to intrastate waters. See S. CONF. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 122-23 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3800; FREDERICK R. AN-
DERSON, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECION: LAW AND POLICY 354 (2d ed. 1990)
(discussing the main policy behind the 1972 amendments); ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
INST., LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 12.02 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1987)
(same); WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 4.2, at 21
(1986) (same).
141. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. at 1059. In International Paper Co. v. Ouel-
lette, 479 U.S. 481, 497-500 (1987), the Court concluded that the CWA does not pre-
empt the common law of the source state. The Court's characterization of interstate
pollution law as federal law suggests the peculiar conclusion that the common law of
the source state is somehow incorporated into federal law, when it is applied to an out-
of-state source.
142. 112 S. Ct. at 1059. The Court failed to support this purported congressional
desire for uniformity. The provisions of the Act that authorize states to impose stan-
dards more stringent than the minimum federal standards appear to conflict with a
congressional desire to achieve uniformity. These provisions do not distinguish inter-
state from intrastate applications. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1313(c), 1370
(1988). Cf. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 497 (holding that the CWA by its terms allows a state
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clusion that EPA-approved state water quality standards comprise fed-
eral law, the Court explained the significance of this characterization.
According to Justice Stevens, because Oklahoma's standards have "a
federal character," courts must accord substantial deference to EPA's
interpretation of them.'43 EPA's CJO ruled that a violation of
Oklahoma's anti degradation policy occurred only if Fayetteville's dis-
charge resulted in an "actually detectable or measurable" change in
water quality. 1" The Court found this ruling to be both reasonable
and workable, because "if every discharge that had some theoretical
impact on a downstream State were interpreted as 'degrading' the
downstream waters, downstream States might wield an effective veto
over upstream discharges."' 4 5
Given the Court's reliance on the CWA's general purposes to sup-
port characterizing EPA-approved state standards as federal law, 14 6 it
is not clear why the prospect of such a veto power troubled the Court.
The ability of an affected state to block the issuance of a permit that
authorizes additional discharges into waters already in violation of
EPA-approved state water quality standards appears consistent with
these same purposes. In any event, the Court seemed convinced that
the practicability of implementing EPA's position on control of inter-
state pollution was an important component of its reasonableness.
Finally, Justice Stevens ratified EPA's application of the Oklahoma
water quality standards. Specifically, the majority upheld the agency's
conclusion that discharges from the Fayetteville plant created no de-
tectable effects on the quality of the Illinois River.1 47 The Court
agreed with EPA's CJO that substantial evidence supported this con-
clusion, and it took the court of appeals to task for failing to adhere to
to impose higher standards on its own point sources). Once EPA approves such stan-
dards, a uniform system of pollution regulation becomes impossible.
143. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. at 1059 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat-
ural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). The Court's "Chevronization"
of federally approved state water quality standards appears to give the EPA's interpre-
tation of those standards more weight than that of the implementing state. Therefore, a
state should eliminate as many ambiguities as possible before submitting its water qual-
ity standards for EPA approval. The states' failure to do so jeopardizes the state's abil-
ity to provide a definitive interpretation of its own standards.
144. 112 S. Ct. at 1059.
145. Id.
146. Id. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (discussing the federal
character of the state standards).
147. 112 S. Ct. at 1059-60.
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it.' 41 The Court concluded that the Tenth Circuit made three mutu-
ally compounding errors. First, it failed to defer to EPA's reasonable
interpretation of its own regulations, as they incorporated Oklahoma's
standards.149 Second, it disregarded well-established standards for re-
viewing agency fact findings, improperly substituting its own find-
ings.150 Third, it incorrectly concluded that EPA's issuance of the
permit was arbitrary due to the agency's failure to consider the existing
degradation of the Illinois River, a factor that was relevant only be-
cause of the Tenth Circuit's erroneous interpretation of the law.1 ' Ac-
cording to the Court, it was not arbitrary for EPA to conclude that,
given the increased flow of relatively clean water from operation of a
new wastewater treatment plant, the benefits to the river from issuance
of the Fayetteville permit outweighed countervailing factors.1 5 1
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ARKANSAS V. OKLAHOMA
The Court's latest decision concerning interstate water pollution
raises the question whether the current legal framework provides
downstream states with the capacity to protect their waters from out-
of-state contamination. The Supreme Court's holding in Arkansas v.
Oklahoma that EPA has the discretion to require upstream point
sources to comply with downstream state water quality standards ap-
pears to provide affected states with an avenue for preserving the qual-
ity of water resources shared with other states. This promise may be
illusory, however.
To begin with, the Court refused to decide whether the CWA re-
quires EPA to apply affected state standards to source state point
sources. Instead, the Court elected to defer to EPA's current willing-
ness to impose such requirements. 53 Given EPA's reversals on other
issues," 4 its adherence to this position is not guaranteed.1 55 In antici-
148. Id. at 1060.
149. Id. Instead, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the CWA prohibits issuance of a
permit when the water body involved already violates water quality standards. Id. at
1060.
150. Id.
151. Id. Under the EPA's interpretation, the status of the river before issuance of
the permit was irrelevant. Rather, EPA considered whether issuance of the permit
would eventually cause a "detectable effect" on water quality. Id.
152. 112 S. Ct. at 1061.
153. Id. at 1056.
154. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984) (describing the convoluted history of the "bubble" policy). See also 23
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pation of that possibility, this part analyzes the issue that the Supreme
Court left unresolved - whether the CWA requires EPA to condition
permits to source state point sources on compliance with downstream
state water quality standards.
Even if EPA continues to adhere to its current interpretation of the
Act, there is reason to doubt whether that interpretation provides a
meaningful opportunity for affected states to force source state dis-
chargers to comply with their water quality standards. The Court
found the EPA's approach to interstate water pollution control reason-
able, partly because of the practicability of implementing that ap-
proach. The second section of this part questions that conclusion. In
particular, EPA has strong political disincentives to impose burden-
some controls on a source state discharger, merely to satisfy another
state's desire to control out-of-state pollution. Furthermore, it proba-
bly will be difficult for an affected state to link its own water quality
problems with the discharges of a particular upstream pollution source.
For these reasons, this part concludes that, despite the Court's holding
in Arkansas v. Oklahoma, the provisions of the current CWA fail to
provide a satisfactory mechanism for abating interstate water
pollution.
A. The CWA Requires the Application of Affected State Water
Quality Standards to Source State Point Sources
1. Statutory Provisions
Section 301(b)(1)(C) is the substantive provision most relevant to
whether the CWA mandates compliance by an upstream point source
with downstream water quality standards. The Arkansas Court
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1459 (Sept. 25, 1992) (reversing previous position that ash generated
by combustion of non-hazardous municipal solid waste is not hazardous waste); 12
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1476 (Mar. 19, 1982) (reversing earlier decision to repeal regulation
prohibiting landfill disposal of containerized liquid hazardous waste due to public
outcry).
155. For nearly 20 years, EPA has required that upstream point sources comply
with downstream standards. See supra note 100 and accompanying text for historical
application of the EPA's position. Courts are more likely to defer to long-standing
statutory interpretations than to sudden, politically motivated shifts in agency policy.
See, eg., Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, 111 S. Ct. 2524, 2535 (1991) (citing Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988) (noting the hazards of accepting
political policy shifts over historical statutory constructions); Exxon Corp. v. Lujan, 970
F.2d 757, 762 (10th Cir. 1992). But cf Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (deferring to agency shift of position moti-
vated by change in presidential administration).
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deemed this provision one of the CWA's central objectives.156 Specifi-
cally, it requires point sources to comply with any effluent limita-
tions1" 7 that are necessary to facilitate compliance with state water
quality standards established pursuant to state law, under authority
preserved by section 510 of the CWA,' 58 even if those restrictions are
more stringent than EPA's technology-based effluent limitations. The
Tenth Circuit interpreted this provision as requiring point sources to
comply with all water quality standards, regardless of whether the
source state or an affected state issues them.' 59 Arkansas argued that
this provision merely set time limits for states that so desired to estab-
lish more stringent water quality standards for in-state waters.16° But
section 301(b)(1)(C) is obviously more than a timing provision; the Du
Pont case' 61 disposed of any argument to the contrary long ago.' 62
Section 301(b)(1)(C) imposes substantive obligations on point sources
to comply with effluent limitations designed to achieve a certain level
156. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. at 1056.
157. An effluent limitation is a restriction established by either EPA or a state "on
quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constit-
uents which are discharged from point sources into navigable waters .. " 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(11) (1988).
158. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (1988). Section 510 of the CWA indicates that the
CWA should not be construed as impairing or affecting "any right or jurisdiction of the
States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such States." See 33
U.S.C. § 1370(2). Even if this "savings" provision confines its recognition of a state's
jurisdiction to discharges originating within that state, as Arkansas argued, the clause
provides separate recognition of a state's rights with respect to its own waters.
Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 605 (10th Cir. 1990). Arguably, Congress intended to
preserve a state's sovereign right to protect itself from invasion by pollution generated in
other states. See supra notes 13-30 and accompanying text (discussing cases dealing
with state sovereignty issues).
159. 908 F.2d at 606.
160. See Maurrasse, supra note 16, at 1169 n.233 (citing Arkansas' brief to the
Tenth Circuit).
161. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
162. In Du Pont, the owners of several inorganic chemical manufacturing plants
challenged the EPA's authority to issue effluent limitations in the form of industry-wide
regulations. Id. at 120. The manufacturers claimed that EPA could impose binding
effluent limitations only through an individualized permit proceeding. Id. EPA argued
that § 301(b) authorizes it to impose effluent limitations by regulation. Id. The indus-
try petitioners responded that § 301 lacked independent, substantive content, and that
the section merely describes the effluent limitations, as well as the deadlines associated
with them, which EPA is authorized to issue under other statutory provisions. Id. at
124. The Court held that § 301(b) is a substantive provision, delegating to EPA the
power to issue effluent limitation regulations of industry-wide scope. Id. at 127-29.
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of water quality.16 It requires compliance with "any applicable"
water quality standard established under authority derived from or
preserved by the CWA. So the issue is whether the standards of down-
stream states "apply" to upstream point sources. Because this provi-
sion is not limited on its face to water quality standards promulgated
by the state that issued the permit, it should be read literally - a point
source must comply with "any" limitations necessary to meet state
water quality standards, including those enacted by an affected state.164
The relevant "procedural"' 165 provisions of the Act reinforce the
conclusion that EPA must require compliance with downstream water
quality standards. For instance, section 401(a)(2) requires EPA to no-
tify any downstream states whose water quality it determines the issu-
ance of an NPDES permit may affect. 166 If a state receiving such
notification determines that the proposed discharge will cause a viola-
tion of its water quality standards, the affected state is entitled to de-
mand that, following a hearing before EPA, EPA condition the permit
upon compliance with applicable water quality standards.
167
163. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 924 (1992).
164. The legislative history of § 301(b)(1)(C) is not illuminating. In the kind of
circular reasoning typical of statutory definitions, a House Committee described "appli-
cable" standards as those that are "pertinent and apply to the activity" and as those that
are "in existence by having been promulgated or implemented." See Maurrasse, supra
note 16, at 1173 (citing H.R. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1422 (1973), reprinted in 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 404
(1973)).
165. This characterization is not meant to imply that the provisions discussed below
fail to create substantive rights or obligations. Rather, they involve primarily the proce-
dures necessary for issuance of a CWA permit.
166. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1988). One commentator argues that § 401(a)(2) only
provides affected states with a right to demand a hearing, and that if Congress wanted
to give them the additional right to demand compliance with their standards, it would
have done so. See Maurrasse, supra note 16, at 1170-71. However, as indicated above,
§ 301(b)(1)(C) can be interpreted to provide just such an additional right. The same
commentator argued that if Congress intended that all upstream point sources would
automatically abide by downstream standards, a hearing would be unnecessary, because
EPA "would automatically know that the upstream state must comply" with down-
stream standards. Id. Even if affected states possess an absolute right to enforce up-
stream compliance with their standards, a hearing is necessary to demonstrate that the
issuance of a permit would result in a violation of an affected state's water quality stan-
dards. A hearing also would be necessary to determine the conditions necessary to
insure compliance with affected state standards.
167. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1988). Absent assurances that the source state can
comply with the affected states' standards, the permit may not be issued. Id.
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As under section 301(b)(1)(C), the issue is whether downstream
standards "apply" to an upstream point source.16 Although Arkansas
argued that they do not, the contrary conclusion of EPA and the Tenth
Circuit is more convincing.1 69 Section 401(a)(2) does not define the
term "applicable," but Congress devoted the preceding portions of the
section to a description of the water quality standards of the objecting
downstream state. Furthermore, if the objective is to "insure compli-
ance" with the affected state's water quality standards, then it is unnec-
essary to make the permit conditional unless those standards apply to
the upstream point source. An upstream point source cannot "violate"
standards that do not apply to it.
A second "procedural" provision, section 402(b)(5), gives affected
states the right to submit recommendations to the permit issuer.
170
The section requires the issuing state to explain any failure to abide by
those recommendations. Standing alone this provision does not dictate
that a permit issuer require compliance with affected state stan-
dards. 171 As the Tenth Circuit explained, however, section 402(b)(5) is
168. The same issue is presented by § 401(d) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d)). Sec-
tion 401(a)(1) requires a permit applicant to obtain certification from the source state to
the effect that the discharge authorized by the permit will comply with the "applicable"
provisions of the CWA (including those relating to state water quality standards). Id.
§ 1341(a)(1). Under § 401(d), the certification required under § 401(a)(1) must specifi-
cally refer to the effluent limitations necessary to assure that the permit applicant will
comply "with any applicable effluent limitations and other limitations under § 301 [of
the CWA]." Id. § 1341(d).
169. See Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 610 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing Lake Erie
Alliance for the Protection of the Coastal Corridor v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 526 F. Supp. 1063, 1075 (W.D. Pa. 1981) ("[T]he purpose of the[§ 1341(a)(2)] notice requirement is to enable a state whose water qualities may be af-
fected by the proposed federal activity an opportunity to insure that its standards will be
complied with."), aff'd without opinion, 707 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
915 (1983)). Even the Supreme Court stated in Arkansas v. Oklahoma that § 401(a)(2)
"appears to prohibit the issuance of any federal license or permit over the objection of
an affected State unless compliance with the affected State's water quality requirements
can be insured." 112 S. Ct. at 1055 (emphasis added).
170. Section 402(b)(5) applies only to permits issued by those states which possess
responsibility, delegated by EPA, to issue CWA permits. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(5) (1988).
The Act, however, requires EPA to follow the same procedures applicable to state per-
mit issuers. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. at 1055 n.7 (citing 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(a)(3) (1988)). EPA also must notify affected states when that agency issues a
permit.
171. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 612. The Tenth Circuit concluded that
§ 402(b)(5) specified only the procedures applicable to permit issuance, which,
"[s]tanding alone,.. . says nothing about whether compliance with affected state [stan-
dards] is optional or obligatory."
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"derivative of" the section 401(a)(2) certification and hearing process,
which does seem to require compliance with downstream standards in
all cases.1" 2 This second procedural provision is not illuminating ex-
cept to the extent that it does not negate the conclusion derived from
sections 301(b)(1)(C) and 401(a)(2).
A third "procedural" provision, section 505(h), is also not disposi-
tive. It gives state governors the right to commence a civil action
against EPA for failure to enforce certain effluent limitations. This
remedy is available when a violation of effluent limitations is occurring
in a state (such as a source state) other than the affected state and is
causing either adverse effects on the public health in the affected state,
or a violation of the latter's water quality standards. 173 Although the
statute does not specify the appropriate relief, it seems clear that if the
plaintiff state prevails, EPA is required to enforce the limitation whose
breach is causing a violation of the affected state standards. Some com-
mentators argue that this provision affords a remedy to an affected
state only when the source state's standards are being violated. 174
However, proof of two separate violations triggers an affected state's
right to sue under this section. First, the plaintiff must demonstrate a
violation of an effluent limitation. Only EPA or the source state may
impose effluent limitations. 175 Second, the plaintiff must prove that
this first violation is causing a violation of a water quality standard in a
state other than the state that issued the effluent limitation. 176 Only an
affected state can offer such proof. Thus, the statute requires EPA to
enforce affected state water quality standards against out-of-state pol-
luters who are in violation of EPA or source state effluent limitations.
The issue that section 505(h) ultimately raises, then, is whether the
172. Id. In addition, after receiving a § 402(b)(5) notification, EPA retains the
right to veto state-issued permits. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2)(A) (1988). Since all per-
mits must insure compliance with § 301, and § 301(b)(1)(C) requires compliance with
"applicable" water quality standards, the analysis again turns on the issue of whether
downstream standards "apply" to upstream point sources. As indicated above,
§ 401(a)(2) appears to answer the question affirmatively. See supra notes 165-67 and
accompanying text (discussing the requirements of § 401(a)(2)).
173. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(h) (1988).
174. See, e.g., Maurrasse, supra note 16, at 1171-72.
175. Cf. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 486, 490 (1987) (holding
that affected states may not establish a separate permit system to regulate out-of-state
point sources).
176. Alternatively, the plaintiffs are entitled to relief if they demonstrate that the
violation of the effluent limitation causes an adverse effect on the public health or wel-
fare in the affected state. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(h) (1988).
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CWA requires permit issuers to devise effluent limitations in a manner
that protects downstream water quality. Sections 301(b)(1)(C) and
401(a)(2) suggest that the answer is yes. 177
The provisions of the CWA are not crystal clear. The Act indicates
in several places that a point source must comply with "applicable"
water quality standards, but fails to define "applicable." Although the
issue is not free from doubt, the more persuasive reading of the Act is
the one that the Tenth Circuit adopted - that Congress intended per-
mit issuers to require compliance with downstream water quality stan-
dards approved by EPA.
2. Statutory Purposes
Even if the CWA's express provisions do not conclusively demon-
strate Congress' intent that all permits require compliance with af-
fected state water quality standards, any other result is inconsistent
with the Act's principal purposes. The stated, if unrealistic, goal of the
Act is to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters" by eliminating the discharge of pollu-
tants.17 8 The Act seeks to achieve this objective by creating a two-
phased program of increasingly stringent effluent limitations, 179 sup-
plemented by any more stringent limitations imposed by the states.18°
The Supreme Court stated in Arkansas v. Oklahoma that the applica-
tion of state water quality standards in the interstate context is wholly
consistent with the Act's broad purposes. 1 ' Any interpretation of the
interstate pollution provisions that prevents downstream states from
protecting their own, high-quality waters from out-of-state pollution
177. See supra notes 156-69 and accompanying text for discussion of the statutory
provisions. Furthermore, the legislative history supports the conclusion that § 505(h)
was intended to afford an affected state the right to demand EPA enforcement of its
own water quality standards against out-of-state polluters. That history indicates that
the provision gives an affected state governor the right to "initiate an action against
[EPA] for an alleged failure to abate pollution in another state that affects the Gover-
nor's state." Maurasse, supra note 16, at 1172 (citing 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
CLEAN WATER AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 328 (1973)). This is precisely the situa-
tion involved in Arkansas v. Oklahoma: as long as the pollution was generated in the
source state, the governor of the affected state need not show a violation of the source
state's water quality standards to support a civil suit against EPA.
178. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1988).
179. Id. § 1311(b)(l)-(2).
180. Id. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1313(c), 1370.
181. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. at 1056 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a),
131 l(b)(1)(C) (1988)).
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would not be. 182
The Supreme Court determined that Congress sought to achieve an
efficient and predictable system of water pollution control through the
CWA's regulatory system." 3 Arkansas argued before the Tenth Cir-
cuit that upstream point sources will be unable to determine which
state's water quality standards apply if the Court allows EPA to re-
quire compliance with affected state standards.184 As that court noted,
however, there are several answers to the contention that Congress'
desire for a predictable permit system precludes the application of af-
fected state standards. First, EPA determines the "applicable" stan-
dards, either in the course of issuing an NPDES permit or reviewing
one issued by a state.'85 By the time a point source begins discharging,
it will know exactly which standards apply. Second, it is unlikely that
182. See, eg., Tennessee v. Champion Int'l Corp., 709 S.W.2d 569, 578 (Tenn.
1986) (Drowota, J., dissenting). The dissent made the following point:
[R]elegating a State with more stringent standards to the lower standards of a bor-
dering State for the sake of uniformity transforms the minimum Federal standards
into maximum standards for many interstate streams. I think this result is con-
trary to the FWPCA and effectively prevents many States from enforcing their
higher standards... on any but their intrastate tributaries.
Id.
In Arkansas v. Oklahoma, the Court characterized the CWA as "a careful balance
among competing policies and interests." 112 S. Ct. at 1057. Accordingly, an approach
to statutory interpretation that attempts to resolve every ambiguity by selecting the
interpretation that provides the maximum amount of pollution reduction is overly sim-
plistic. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481,494-95 (1987) (not-
ing that in enacting CWA, Congress recognized that efforts to reduce water pollution
had to be tempered by competing considerations such as economic and technological
feasibility). See also Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 371 (1986) (making a similar
argument concerning hazardous waste statute).
Nevertheless, Professors Farber and Frickey recently argued that the courts should
pay close attention to the "strong endorsement of environmental values" reflected in
legislation such as the CWA, rather than resorting solely to a careful "parsing [of] spe-
cific clauses in the statute." Farber & Frickey, supra note 58, at 892. They contend
that such legislation reflects values and that courts should resort to those values in
resolving questions of statutory interpretation. Id. This author endorsed such an ap-
proach elsewhere. See Glicksman, supra note 16. It provides a legitimate aid to the
resolution of the interpretive issues addressed in this article. See also Richard E. Levy
and Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court's Envi-
ronmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REv. 343, 367-68, 374-77 (1989).
183. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 495-96 (arguing that
the application of affected state common laws would cause unpredictable results).
184. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 606-07 (10th Cir. 1990). Cf. Illinois v. City
of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir. 1984) (making a similar argument in the
context of affected state common law), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985).
185. 908 F.2d at 607.
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the standards of a plethora of affected states will bind a particular point
source, even on a multi-state body of water such as the Mississippi
River. Due to the limitations of current modeling and related technol-
ogies, the impact of an individual point source on water quality be-
comes so attenuated at some point as to become undetectable. 186 A
point source is only responsible for violations attributable to its dis-
charges.18 7 Third, even if Congress designed the statute to avoid cha-
otic regulation, the CWA's preservation of common law remedies for
those injured by pollution indicates its willingness to live with at least a
certain modicum of unpredictability. 188
The potential for conflict between the interests of either the federal
and state governments or the source state and the affected states pro-
vides a more persuasive argument against the unilateral ability of af-
fected states to insist that upstream sources comply with their water
quality standards. It is indisputable that Congress sought to protect
states' rights when it enacted the CWA.189 This goal, however, does
not dictate the conclusion that subjecting an upstream point source to
affected state water quality standards constitutes an unwarranted and
unacceptable infringement upon the rights of the upstream state.19 As
the Supreme Court concluded in Arkansas v. Oklahoma, once EPA
approves a state water quality standard, it becomes incorporated into
federal law.191 From that point on, the affected state standards reflect
the interests of both the promulgating state and the federal govern-
186. Id. See also Bushong, supra note 71, at 258-59 (discussing the diminishing
impact of pollution as it travels from its source to downstream locations).
187. See infra notes 221-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of a suggested
modified standard of causation. This standard would facilitate proof of causation, but
even under that proposal, a point source would likely not be held responsible for water
quality violations occurring several states downstream.
188. See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3746-47. See supra note 41 for the precise language of the Senate
report.
189. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1988) (stating Congress' intent "to recognize,
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce,
and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the development and use.., of land and water
resources").
190. At least one commentator reached this fallacious conclusion. See Maurrasse,
supra note 16, at 1174.
191. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1058-59 (1992) (citing 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.4(d)). The Court sought to eliminate the confusion the statute causes concerning
which standards to apply to a point source. It indicated that the EPA's regulations, by
incorporating approved state water quality standards into federal law, effectively deter-
mine that such standards are "applicable" to a source state polluter.
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ment.192 Since the interests of the federal government and the affected
state now coincide, any resulting conflict between federal and state in-
terests corresponds to the clash between the interests of the source and
affected states. 193
Although Congress wanted to avoid one state's intrusion on a sister
state's sovereignty when it enacted the CWA, such a clash is inevitable
in the context of interstate pollution. The interests of the source and
affected state are often diametrically opposed.' 94 Critics of the Tenth
Circuit's decision contend that the court's interpretation of the Act
amounts to an excessive infringement on the upstream state's economic
and environmental policies. 9 ' But a refusal to subject upstream point
sources to affected state standards represents a similar intrusion on the
policies of the affected state. In such a situation, downstream states
would be helpless to combat the adverse effects of upstream discharges
without imposing tighter limitations that impose higher costs on their
own industries. 196 Given the reciprocal nature of the conffict, the issue
is which of the two states' interests Congress intended to prevail in this
situation.
It is possible that Congress intended that EPA resolve interstate con-
192. Accordingly, the imposition of the EPA-approved water quality standards of
an affected state on a source state polluter is not the "unilateral" imposition of one
state's standards on another.
193. Cf. Murchison, supra note 28, at 39 (describing the strong federal interest in
the balance struck regarding the use of resources not confined within state boundaries);
Maria O'Brien, Comment, The Ultimate "Advisor": Rights of a Downstream State
Under the Clean Water Act, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 949, 964 (1991) (arguing that to
allow an upstream state with less stringent standards to indirectly "regulate" affected
state waters would be contrary to Congress' intent to use water quality standards as a
supplement to technology in efforts to minimize water pollution).
194. See supra notes 50-68 and accompanying text for an explanation of the diver-
gent interests.
195. See, e.g., Maurrasse, supra note 16, at 1174, 1176 (stating that the appellate
court's decision frustrates the upstream state's ability to meet the economic needs of its
citizens, placing its economy "at the mercy of downstream state policies").
196. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 606 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing EPA
brief at 21) (EPA argued that Arkansas' construction of the Act made achievement of
downstream standards "impossible in many circumstances or... possible... only by
imposing a disproportionate burden in the downstream state"). See also id. at 606 n. 10
(stating that EPA has interpreted the Act as manifesting "an intent to distribute the
burden of meeting water quality standards among all dischargers on and affecting a
particular waterway."); Farber & Frickey, supra note 58, at 893 n.85 (refusing to apply
affected state's standards to source state discharger means that "the receiving state is
forced to rely on whatever relief the rules of the discharging state might provide," thus
injuring federalism values).
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fficts on a case-by-case basis rather than through the application of an
across-the-board rule subjecting upstream point sources to or excusing
them from the obligation to comply with affected state water quality
standards. Several factors, though, support the conclusion that Con-
gress intended in general to favor the interests of the downstream state.
First, the application of affected state standards to upstream point
sources is more consistent with the predominant legislative goals of the
CWA than a refusal to apply those standards. 197 Second, by approving
the affected state standards, EPA acknowledged the value of preserving
the particular affected state resources involved in the dispute. Third,
the failure to provide an effective mechanism for applying affected state
standards to upstream point sources tends to promote forum-shopping
among industries seeking to avoid stringent pollution controls.'98
However, in enacting most of the federal pollution control statutes,
Congress sought to discourage states from vying for industry by impos-
ing lenient pollution controls.1 99 That desire is one reason for the im-
position of nationally uniform controls on new pollution sources.2°°
197. See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text for a description of the rele-
vance in this situation of the legislative goals of the CWA. See also Glicksman, supra
note 16, at 209 ("[T]here is no evidence to support the conclusion that Congress chose
to resolve the conflicting interests of the two states by subordinating the interests of the
receiving state to those of the state from which the pollution emanates."). But cf. Inter-
national Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 490-91 (1987) (stating that because af-
fected states are in a subordinate position to source states in the CWA regulatory
program, an affected state may not establish a permit system to regulate an out-of-state
source).
198. 908 F.2d at 606 n. 11. In Arkansas v. Oklahoma, EPA argued that exempting
source state polluters from affected state water quality standards "would encourage
sources to locate in states with less stringent water quality requirements. A source lo-
cated immediately above a state boundary would not be required to meet the more
stringent requirements, if any, of the downstream state, even though that state may be
most affected by the discharge." Id. The AJ raised the same point earlier in the
proceedings. See id. at 604. See also O'Brien, supra note 193, at 965 (noting that the
Tenth Circuit's decision "aids in the elimination of 'pollution shopping,' something the
1972 amendments to the CWA clearly were designed to prevent").
199. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 847 (7th Cir. 1977);
S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 73 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326,
4398.
200. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (1988); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1988).
See also Carie Goodman McKinney, Statute of Limitations for Citizen Suits Under the
Clean Water Act, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 195, 198 n.20 (1986) (citing 118 CONG. REC.
10,661 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Podell)).
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3. Constitutional Concerns
To the extent it remains unclear whether Congress intended EPA to
resolve interstate conflicts on a case-by-case basis or to require all point
sources to comply with downstream water quality standards, constitu-
tional principles suggest that any doubts be resolved in favor of the
mandatory application of affected state standards. The failure to apply
these standards to out-of-state dischargers raises serious constitutional
concerns that requiring such sources to comply with downstream stan-
dards does not raise.
If upstream polluters are not subjected to affected state water quality
standards, they may infringe upon the affected state's "quasi-sover-
eign" interest in protecting the integrity of its environment, 20 1 recog-
201. See supra notes 13-30 and accompanying text for a description of cases recog-
nizing that interest. See also Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972) (noting that "[a]
state with high water-quality standards may well ask that its strict standards be honored
and that it not be compelled to lower itself to the more degrading standards of a neigh-
bor."); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901) (holding that the federal govern-
ment has a duty to provide a remedy for the affected state); Farber & Frickey, supra
note 58, at 893 (criticizing the result in Milwaukee H for failing to provide adequate
protection to the sovereign interests of the affected state); Glicksman, supra note 16, at
204 (analyzing state sovereignty rights vis-i-vis interstate pollution). Although Milwau-
kee 11 held that the CWA preempted federal common law in the context of interstate
water pollution, that Court did not find that Congress intended to revoke the "quasi-
sovereign" rights of affected states, which were recognized in cases such as Tennessee
Copper and Milwaukee I. In fact, the Act explicitly preserves "any right ... of the
states with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such states." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1370(2) (1988). That savings clause arguably preserves the quasi-sovereign rights rec-
ognized in the cases preceding Milwaukee II. See supra note 158 for an explanation of
§ 1370(2). Moreover, it is unclear whether Congress has the authority to usurp such
rights. The Supreme Court's analysis of whether the Tenth Amendment imposes limits
on Congress' powers under Article I of the Constitution appears unsettled. Compare
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985) (quoting 2
ANNALS OF CONG. 1897 (1791)) ("Interference with the powers of the States was no
constitutional criterion of the power of Congress... if [a power was] given, [Congress]
might exercise it, although it should interfere with the laws, or even the Constitution of
the States.") with New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2418 (1992) ("[T]he
Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to
limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States."). New York v. United
States may represent a movement back toward the view that the Tenth Amendment
imposes affirmative limits on delegated powers such as Congress' Commerce Clause
authority. See, eg., National League of Cities v. Usury, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). A return
to the constitutional limits imposed in National League of Cities would raise doubts on
whether the Congress which enacted the 1972 CWA amendments possessed sufficient
authority to revoke the states' sovereign rights to protect their environment, which were
recognized in Tennessee Copper and Milwaukee I.
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nized as long ago as Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.2' 2 Although the
application of these standards intrudes upon the source state's sover-
eignty, this intrusion is constitutionally less troublesome than the in-
trusion on affected state rights that would otherwise result. A state
that permits its industries to impose externalities on neighboring states
arguably forfeits the right to invoke the principles of self-determina-
tion2°3 inherent in the concept of state sovereignty. 2°
In addition, allowing the upstream state to decide whether to permit
the spillover effects of its industries to reach downstream states raises
dormant Commerce Clause concerns that are unlikely to arise if the
downstream state controls such spillovers.20 5 Source state interests are
more likely to receive adequate representation in the political processes
of the affected state than vice-versa. As long as affected state water
quality standards apply equally to affected and source state discharg-
ers,2°6 the affected state's political processes, by affording representa-
tion to in-state industry, also take into account the analogous interests
of source state polluters.207 If source state dischargers are located near
202. 206 U.S. 230 (1907). See supra notes 19-22 for a discussion of Georgia v. Ten-
nessee Copper Co.
203. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2431 (quoting Coleman v.
Thompson, 115 L. Ed. 640, 675 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)) ("State sovereignty is
not just an end in itself: 'Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive
from the diffusion of sovereign power.' ").
204. See Stewart, supra note 55, at 1227:
[W]ithin the context of a federal system with co-equal states, a state's claim to
autonomy is entitled to respect only insofar as it allows a like autonomy for sister
states. Accordingly, a state should not be entitled to invoke the principle of local
self-determination against federal controls where that state generates significant
spillovers which impair the corresponding ability of sister states to determine the
environmental quality they shall enjoy.
Id.
205. See Pierce, supra note 65, at 653 ("States should not be allowed to make regu-
latory decisions when those decisions have the potential to impose negative spillovers on
other states."). See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text for a description of the
dormant Commerce Clause limitations imposed on the states.
206. See infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of the applica-
tion of affected state water quality standards in a manner that would raise constitutional
concern.
207. Affected states have a legitimate desire to protect their resource base and their
residents against harms attributable to out-of-state pollution. Therefore, the governing
Commerce Clause test in this situation should be whether the burden imposed on inter-
state commerce by application of affected state standards would be excessive in relation
to the benefits provided to the downstream state. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986) (holding that while a
state may seek to lower prices for its consumers, the resulting burden imposed on other
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol43/iss1/6
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
the border of the source and affected states, as in Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, the converse proposition is unlikely to be true. The source
state receives a disproportionate share of the economic benefits attribu-
table to the industrial operations responsible for the pollution, while
the adverse environmental impacts are imposed disproportionately
upon the affected state. The Supreme Court's dormant Commerce
Clause cases recognize the inability of the source state's political
processes to provide adequate representation to the affected state's in-
terests in precisely this situation.2" 8 Federal intervention, in the form
of EPA's application of affected state water quality standards to source
state dischargers, may redress this imbalance and maximize the possi-
bility that all relevant interests receive an adequate opportunity to pro-
tect themselves. 2°9
states to surrender any competitive advantages violated the Commerce Clause); Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (holding that evenhanded application of a
state statute will be upheld absent excessive burden on interstate commerce). This test
applies "where other legislative objectives are credibly advanced and there is no patent
discrimination against interstate trade." See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v.
Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2014 n.5 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624
(1978)) (holding that a statute requiring out-of-state waste producers to pay additional
fees for in-state dumping violated the Commerce Clause). It is unlikely that a court
would find an affected state standard unconstitutional under this test. See H.P. Hood &
Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531-32 (1949) (recognizing a "broad power in the State
to protect its inhabitants against perils to health or safety .... even by use of measures
which bear adversely upon interstate commerce," so long as the state does not "promote
its own economic advantages by curtailment or burdening of interstate commerce");
Pierce, supra note 65, at 623 ("[Tjhis balancing test is tilted heavily toward the state's
interest.... The Court defers to the state's balance of its health and safety goals against
the nation's economic goals unless the resulting burden on national economic goals is
'clearly excessive.' "); Stewart, Interstate Resource Conflicts, supra note 63, at 243 ("A
state has an exceptionally strong interest in controlling... its land and natural re-
sources; such measures should be substantially immune from federal judicial scrutiny as
long as they affect those in other states only through markets and by their terms do not
discriminate against them."). See also Glicksman, supra note 16, at 211-12.
Choice-of-law principles dictate the same result. In interstate tort cases, for the pur-
pose of determining liability and assessing damages, there is no constitutional difficulty
in applying the law of the state where an injury occurred. Gaynor, supra note 78, at
258. An affected state has a legitimate interest in protecting its residents against injury
and in providing compensation for those who have been injured. Id. (citing Interna-
tional Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 502 n.1 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)). Because the interstate tort conflict presents no constitu-
tional difficulties, the application of a downstream state's water quality standards to
upstream point sources should similarly be permissible.
208. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text for a description of the limita-
tions placed on states by the dormant Commerce Clause.
209. The dormant Commerce Clause does not prohibit an affected state from apply-
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In at least one situation, however, an affected state's attempt to ap-
ply its water quality standards to upstream point sources may violate
the Commerce Clause.21° Suppose that an affected state imposes less
stringent water quality standards on wholly intrastate waters than on
interstate waters. If affected state standards apply to upstream point
sources, the affected state might effectively provide its own industries
with a competitive advantage over those in the source state, because
source state dischargers would likely be subject to more stringent con-
trols than the affected state's own polluters.211 Attempts by an affected
ing its standards to upstream dischargers for another reason. Congress has the author-
ity to waive the limitations otherwise imposed on state regulatory authority by the
negative implications of the Commerce Clause. See, eg., Stewart, Interstate Resource
Conflicts, supra note 63, at 256 (citing Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408
(1946)) (finding valid a South Carolina statute which taxed all out-of-state insurance
companies even though it would have been invalid absent a federal statute authorizing
such taxation); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891) (upholding congressional power to
allow a state to regulate the flow of alcohol across its borders). By authorizing EPA to
approve the affected state's water quality standards, even as applied to interstate waters,
Congress may have waived any such limitations.
210. Source state dischargers may seek judicial application of the more stringent
level of scrutiny that applies to the "economic protectionism" cases in a broader range
of cases than the one described here. For example, they might argue that the applica-
tion of affected state standards to source state dischargers constitutes an effort by the
affected state to erect a blockade against waste. See infra note 212 for a discussion of
economic protectionism. See also Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan
Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992) (holding that state's waste import
restrictions unambiguously discriminated against interstate commerce); City of Phila-
delphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621-23 (1978) (invalidating New Jersey law which
prohibited importation of waste). In similar situations, the Court has applied strict
scrutiny. See, eg., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (invalidating
state statute that required out-of-state milk to be sold at minimum price established for
milk produced within the state). Unless the affected state seeks to provide its own in-
dustries with a competitive advantage by exempting them from the standards applicable
to out-of-state polluters, however, cases such as Baldwin would be distinguishable. The
application of affected state water quality standards to out-of-state and in-state dis-
chargers alike reflects neither an "avowed purpose" nor a "necessary tendency" to
"suppress or mitigate the consequences of competition between the states." Id. at 522.
Rather than seeking to erect barriers as a form of economic retaliation, the even-handed
application of affected state standards to all dischargers accomplishes the affected state's
objective of protecting its resource base from environmental harm, regardless of the
source of those threats. Id. In such cases, the courts apply the Pike balancing test
rather than the strict scrutiny test, which is reserved for economic protectionism cases.
See also Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. at 2014 n.5 (1992)
(quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)) (holding lenient
balancing test is available where there is "no patent discrimination against interstate
trade.").
211. A recent Senate bill to reauthorize the CWA addresses the possibility that an
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state to retain for its own citizens the value of water resources may
appear as economic protectionism, and give rise to a successful Com-
merce Clause challenge.212
In the event that congressional intent is unclear on resolving the con-
flict between affected and source state interests, constitutional concerns
support the conclusion that the courts should resolve the ambiguity in
favor of the downstream state. Congress probably would not have en-
dorsed any approach to the application of the CWA's interstate pollu-
tion provisions that would usurp the ability of an affected state to
protect its resource base from external as well as internal threats.
B. EPA 's Current Approach to Interstate Water Pollution Control Is
Impractical
EPA's continued adherence to the position that affected state water
quality standards apply to upstream point sources will not necessarily
afford affected states adequate protection against interstate water pollu-
tion. Both political and practical barriers may hinder affected state
efforts to stem the flow of out-of-state pollution.
1. Political Barriers to Effective Interstate Water Pollution Control
Even if EPA conforms in theory to its current interpretation of the
CWA's interstate pollution provisions, the agency may be wary of ap-
affected state might attempt to exempt in-state dischargers from more stringent water
quality standards applicable to upstream point sources. The bill authorizes EPA to veto
a state issued permit on the basis of the adverse impact caused by the source state
discharger on downstream water quality standards. This veto power would be condi-
tioned on an EPA finding that sources in the affected state "are subject to the same
requirements and policies" as those applicable to dischargers in the source state. See S.
REP. No. 1081, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 19(b) (1991). See also id. § 19(c) (authorizing
EPA to grant relief to petitioning affected states under similar conditions).
212. See Stewart, Interstate Resource Conflicts, supra note 63, at 254 (arguing that
state measures nominally directed at environmental values but in reality aimed at pro-
tecting in-state firms are constitutionally suspect). In a class of cases known as the
"economic protectionism" cases, in which the Supreme Court found that state regula-
tion discriminates against interstate commerce either in purpose or effect, the Court
applies a "virtually per se rule of invalidity." See, eg., Chemical Waste Management,
Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. at 2015 n.6 (invalidating an Alabama law which charged higher
fees on out-of-state users of Alabama landfills); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Michigan Dep't of Nat. Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992); City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (holding invalid a New Jersey law that banned out-of-state
waste). There is no clear delineation between the situations in which the Court applies
the balancing test and the circumstances meriting the per se rule of invalidity. See
Chemical Waste Management, 112 S. Ct. at 2014 n.5.
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plying those provisions in a way that imposes significant constraints on
source state industries. Before assuming a position in the Justice De-
partment, Richard Stewart expressed the view that EPA tends to
shrink from resolving "heated interstate controversies" through the ap-
plication of stringent state standards, because the use of uniform na-
tional standards "reduces decision-making costs and political
controversy." '2 13 Prior to the 1990 CAA amendments, the agency con-
sistently refused to afford relief to states complaining about acid rain
emanating from emissions in other states.21 4 This agency position sup-
ports Professor Stewart's suspicions. EPA's reluctance to take a posi-
tion on the constitutionality of state efforts to exclude out-of-state solid
and hazardous waste provides another example of the agency's ten-
dency to steer clear of contentious interstate disputes.
2. Practical Barriers to Effective Interstate Water Pollution Control
If EPA puts aside such disinclinations and provides affected states
with the opportunity to force source state permittees to comply with
affected state water quality standards, its current test for triggering this
obligation is still likely to present affected states with considerable diffi-
culties. The test that the CJO applied and the Court approved in Ar-
kansas requires an affected state to demonstrate, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that a source state discharge "cause[s] an actual, detecta-
ble violation" of the affected state's water quality standards.21 5 The
history of interstate water pollution control is replete with evidence
documenting the difficulty of tracing adverse effects on water quality in
one state to a particular source located in another state.21 6 The abys-
213. Stewart, Interstate Resource Conflicts, supra note 63, at 260-61. Professor
Stewart also indicated that norms of reciprocity discourage Congress from delegating
broad discretion to impose measures that afford economic advantages to certain states
or regions. Id. at 261.
214. EPA denied petitioning states relief from the interstate transport of acid rain
and its precursors in the following cases: New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir.
1988); Air Pollution Control Dist. v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071 (6th Cir. 1984); New York v.
EPA, 716 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1983); New York v. EPA, 710 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1983);
Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1982); Connecticut v. EPA, 656 F.2d 902
(2d Cir. 1981).
215. See Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 603 (10th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
See also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1059 (1992) (noting that the CJO ruled
that an Oklahoma standard would be violated if the Fayetteville discharge "effected an
'actually detectable or measurable' change in water quality.").
216. Most of the early efforts to abate interstate pollution were based on the federal
common law and founded on the affected state's inability to prove causation. See, e.g.,
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mal failure of the pre-1972 FWPCA enforcement efforts, for example,
was attributable largely to the inability of the federal government to
identify the particular sources of the dangers to health and safety.217
Despite advances in pollution detection technology since the adoption
of the current statutory structure, a considerable body of scholarship
supports the view that current scientific and statistical methodologies
lack the capability to provide causal proof that a particular discharge
increases water quality degradation.218
The decision in Arkansas v. Oklahoma endorses a statutory mecha-
nism that is unlikely to constitute a reliable resource for affected states
seeking to combat interstate pollution. The next part of this article
describes several possible methods of remedying the deficiencies of the
current scheme.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVED MECHANISMS FOR COMBATTING
INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
If existing legal mechanisms provide insufficient opportunities for af-
fected states to protect themselves against out-of-state pollution, these
states must find more effective solutions. This part suggests adminis-
trative, judicial, and legislative alternatives to the current system. It
concludes that the best hope for more effective control of interstate
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309-13 (1921) (holding that New Jersey was
unable to prove that New York's sewage disposal scheme polluted New Jersey waters);
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 526 (1906) (holding that Missouri failed to prove the
deleterious effects of Lake Michigan run-off). But see New Jersey v. New York, 283
U.S. 473, 483 (1931) (holding that New York's floating garbage was a nuisance to New
Jersey); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238-39 (1907) (holding Ten-
nessee plant's release of sulfur dioxide threatened damage to forests, vegetation, and
health of Georgia residents).
217. See, e.g., Andreen, supra note 71, at 214; Gaba, supra note 71, at 1179; Gay-
nor, supra note 78, at 264; EPA v. California ex reL State Water Resources Control Bd.,
426 U.S. 200, 202-03 (1976) (explaining difficulty of enforcing FWPCA).
218. Bushong, supra note 71, at 262-63. Natural fluctuations in stream quality,
which occur on both a daily basis, as a result of biological processes within the stream,
and on a periodic basis, as a result of random events such as rain storms, hamper efforts
to trace a given harm back to its source. "Such naturally occurring variability could
often statistically mask small increases in the frequency of [water quality standard] vio-
lations." Id. See also O'Brien, supra note 193, at 965 (stating that "the 'detectability'
of the impact of a discharge with or without computer modeling can be an evidentiary
nightmare in an administrative hearing"). Cf. Bruce M. Kramer, Transboundary Air
Pollution and the Clean Air Act: An Historical Perspective, 32 KAN. L. Rnv. 181, 182
(1983) (discussing "the inability of science to come up with the 'smoking gun"' in most
transboundary air pollution cases).
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water pollution lies in CWA amendments patterned after the interstate
pollution provisions of the 1990 CAA amendments.
A. Administrative Solutions
The principal difficulty with EPA's current interpretation of the
CWA's interstate pollution provisions lies in the requirement that an
affected state prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that source
state pollution is causing an actual, detectable violation of affected state
water quality standards. Based on EPA's denial of all the petitions
filed under the CAA's interstate pollution provisions,219 and the simi-
larity of the burdens of proof imposed on affected states by the inter-
state pollution provisions of the two statutes, 220 it seems that
satisfaction of the standard lies beyond many affected states.
Affected states have several means of eliminating this obstacle at the
agency level. First, it is not clear from Arkansas v. Oklahoma whether
the "actual, detectable" violation standard is derived from federal or
state law.221 The Tenth Circuit held that EPA's decision to issue the
permit to Fayetteville was arbitrary because it would authorize addi-
tional discharges into a river that was already in violation of state
water quality standards. 22 The Supreme Court disagreed, concluding
that the appellate court misinterpreted both the CWA and Oklahoma's
water quality standards. If an affected state wanted to avoid the obli-
gation to prove that issuance of a permit to an upstream point source
would cause an "actual, detectable" violation of its standards, it could
argue to EPA that the Arkansas Court's decision was based only to a
limited extent on the provisions of the CWA. Under this interpretation
of the decision, the Court held first that the CWA does not necessarily
219. Before the adoption of the 1990 amendments, the CAA authorized a state to
petition EPA for a finding that emissions generated in another state are responsible for
air quality problems in the petitioning state. If EPA issued such a finding, the source
state was required to revise its implementation plan to control the offending emissions.
42 U.S.C. § 7426(b)-(c) (1988). See infra at notes 239-47 and accompanying text for a
more complete description of these provisions.
220. The EPA's interpretation of the CAA required the affected state to demon-
strate a violation of its air quality standards as a result of a discharge from the source
state. Further, EPA required an affected state to trace the violation to a specific source
within the source state. See infra notes 242-47 and accompanying text for a discussion
on the implications of these standards.
221. See supra notes 137-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of this aspect of
the Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas v. Oklahoma.
222. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
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prohibit the issuance of a permit to a new point source that will dis-
charge into a body of water that already violates state water quality
standards.223 The Court's second holding was that EPA's issuance of
the permit was not arbitrary because Oklahoma failed to demonstrate
that the treatment plant's discharge would itself cause an actual, de-
tectable violation of its water quality standards.224 The standard of
proof the Court endorsed in this second holding was arguably derived
from Oklahoma's water quality standards, rather than from the CWA.
Accordingly, if, in a subsequent interstate pollution dispute, the af-
fected state's law requires a less rigorous showing to link a particular
discharger to a violation of its water quality standards, EPA should
apply that standard of proof rather than the "actual, detectable" viola-
tion standard derived from Oklahoma law.
Second, if EPA insists that the "actual, detectable" violation stan-
dard endorsed in the Arkansas decision was based on federal rather
than state law, affected states nevertheless could try to convince EPA
that this burden of proof is too difficult to satisfy and thus inconsistent
with statutory purposes.225 The Court in the Arkansas case held not
that the manner in which EPA interpreted and applied the statute was
the only permissible one, but only that it was reasonable. The agency
is therefore free to exercise its discretion to adopt other reasonable ap-
proaches to statutory implementation. EPA might concur in the denial
of a permit to an upstream source if, for example, an affected state
demonstrated that the upstream source, either alone or in combination
with other upstream sources, may reasonably be anticipated to cause or
contribute to violations of affected state water quality standards.226
Congress made similar amendments to other pollution abatement
provisions.227
223. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
225. A priori, arguments that support imposition of a lighter burden of proof on
affected states provide ammunition to counter any attempt by EPA to reverse its long-
standing position that upstream point source permits must require compliance with
downstream state standards.
226. If at any time several new point source permit applications were pending, EPA
might hold a consolidated evidentiary hearing to consider the aggregate impact of
granting the permits at various discharge levels. If affected state water quality stan-
dards were already being violated at the time of a permit application for a new upstream
point source, EPA might provide an opportunity for the pollution control agency of the
upstream state to reduce effluent limitations in outstanding permits as necessary to elim-
inate the violations, despite the issuance of the requested permit.
227. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1) (1988) (authorizing EPA to regulate a motor
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The agency might even consider the adoption of a presumption that
issuance of a permit to a new upstream point source228 causes or con-
tributes to violations of affected state water quality standards existing
at the time of the permit application. Such a presumption would shift
the burden to the permit applicant to prove through the submission of
computer models or other evidence that permit issuance would not re-
sult in further deterioration of water quality. Common sense supports
the application of such a presumption in this narrow situation.229 The
existence of water quality standard violations in the vicinity of the pro-
posed new source or downstream from that source suggests that dis-
charges by prior polluters already have exceeded the assimilative
capacity of the receiving water. If the receiving water is unable to as-
similate current levels of pollution, then the discharge of additional
pollutants into that water worsens the situation.
Compared to the one endorsed in Arkansas v. Oklahoma, this ap-
proach provides affected states with a more realistic opportunity to
block permits to source state polluters that contribute to downstream
water quality standard violations. It is also more consistent with rele-
vant statutory objectives than the approach endorsed in that case. The
CWA reflects Congress' intent that NPDES permits prohibit upstream
point sources from violating affected state water quality standards.230
It is unlikely that Congress imposed this requirement without an ex-
pectation that EPA would apply it in a manner that provided a mean-
ingful opportunity for affected states to protect themselves against
water quality degradation attributable to out-of-state sources.
B. Judicial Solutions
An affected state should take advantage of all available opportunities
vehicle fuel additive if, in the agency's judgment, its emission product "causes, or con-
tributes to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger the public
health or welfare"). The current version of this provision dates back to the 1977 CAA
amendments, which codified the precautionary interpretation of the previous version in
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
228. The same presumption also might apply to applications to increase discharge
levels at currently permitted upstream point sources.
229. The adoption of this presumption would amount to an administrative version
of the Tenth Circuit's holding in Arkansas v. Oklahoma that the CWA and Oklahoma's
water quality standards prohibit the issuance of a permit to a new point source seeking
to discharge into water which already violates state standards. See supra notes 137-38
and accompanying text for a discussion of this aspect of the Tenth Circuit's decision.
230. See supra notes 156-212 and accompanying text.
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that arise during the permit issuance process to convince EPA of the
need to limit source state discharges to avoid violations of affected state
standards.2 3 ' The agency could create a more effective interstate pollu-
tion abatement mechanism than the agency's current regime is likely to
supply, either in the context of an individual permit proceeding or
through amendments to the NPDES permit regulations. If relief is not
forthcoming in either forum, an affected state may attempt to seek a
reversal of that result in court.
An affected state may raise two kinds of arguments. First, it may
convince a court to answer the question left open in Arkansas v.
Oklahoma. Based on the analysis above,2 32 the affected state could ar-
gue that the Act requires EPA to apply affected state standards to up-
stream point sources, and that, because it hinges on an unworkable
causation standard, EPA's current approach is inconsistent with that
requirement. Given the courts' inclination to defer to agency factual
findings and policy choices,2 33 it is unlikely that a court would issue an
across-the-board ruling invalidating EPA's current approach to imple-
mentation of the CWA's interstate pollution provisions.
Second, even if a court is unwilling to overturn the entire policy, an
affected state may be able to convince a court that, in applying that
policy to the facts of a particular case, EPA has abused the discretion
the Supreme Court recognized in Arkansas v. Oklahoma.2 34 For exam-
ple, the Court held there that EPA had not abused its discretion, in
part because the agency concluded that the benefits to the Illinois River
provided by the new Fayetteville plant outweighed the costs of issuing
a permit to a new discharger.2 35 Would the same result be appropriate,
231. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a)(2), 1342(1,)(5) (1988).
232. See supra notes 156-212 and accompanying text for a discussion of why the
CWA requires upstream point sources to comply with water quality standards of af-
fected states.
233. See, eg., Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 470 U.S. 116, 131 (1985) (deferring to
the EPA's decision to make variances available to indirect dischargers of toxic pollu-
tants); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 862 (1984) (granting broad discre-
tion in implementing the policies of the 1977 amendments to the CAA).
234. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 595, 1056-58 (10th Cir. 1990). Cf. In-
ternational Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491 (1987) ("[A]n affected state does
not have the authority to block the issuance of the permit [to an upstream, out-of-state
point source] if it is dissatisfied with the proposed standards. An affected State's only
recourse is to apply to the EPA Administrator, who then has the discretion to disap-
prove the permit if he concludes that the discharges will have an undue impact on
interstate waters.").
235. 112 S. Ct. at 1060.
1993]
Washington University Open Scholarship
166 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 43:119
however, if, instead of a publicly owned treatment plant, a new indus-
trial point source applied for permission to discharge into an interstate
water body already in violation of affected state standards? It is far less
likely that issuance of a permit in this situation would provide any en-
vironmental benefits.236 Perhaps a court would be willing to second-
guess EPA's cost-benefit assessment in such a situation. Similarly,
EPA's failure to consider the cumulative impact of multiple upstream
permits might provide grounds for concluding that in issuing a permit
over an affected state's objection, the agency abused its discretion.
C. Legislative Solutions
If affected states are unable to solicit an acceptable response from
EPA or the courts, legislative solutions may present a viable alterna-
tive. One obvious possibility is an amendment that overrules the Mil-
waukee 1I decision and restores federal common law remedies in
interstate pollution disputes. Several commentators describe the bene-
fits that such an amendment would provide.2 37 As indicated above,
however, defects inherent in a case-by-case approach to pollution con-
trol render this solution alone incapable of providing an effective solu-
tion to interstate water pollution.238
A second legislative alternative would be to adopt amendments pat-
terned after the 1990 CAA provisions that deal with interstate pollu-
tion. Before 1990, the Act required that all state implementation plans
(SIPs) contain adequate provisions designed to abate interstate air pol-
lution.239 It also established a mechanism through which one state
could petition EPA for a finding that any major source in another state
would emit air pollution in violation of those required plan provi-
236. If the new plant replaced an older plant which had outdated pollution control
technology, issuance of a permit to the new plant might represent a net benefit to the
environment, similar to the potential benefit created by the issuance of a permit to the
waste treatment plant in Arkansas v. Oklahoma. See generally Bruce A. Ackerman &
Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market
Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 173-75 (1988).
237. See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, supra note 58, at 889-95; Murchison, supra note
28, at 29, 45-47; Collins, supra note 16, at 407; Dexter & Schwarzenbart, supra note 16,
at 690.
238. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text for a discussion on the short-
comings of common law litigation.
239. The Act required that SIPs prohibit a stationary source from emitting air pol-
lutants in amounts sufficient to hamper any other state's effort to promote the national
ambient air quality standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E)(i) (1988).
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sions. 2 '4 If EPA issued such a finding, any major source identified in
the finding would be in violation of the source state's SIP (and there-
fore subject to federal sanctions), despite the source's compliance with
any permit issued by the source state.241
Most regarded the provisions designed to minimize interstate air pol-
lution as generally ineffective.242 EPA failed to act against any sources
of interstate pollution under either of the two relevant statutory provi-
sions.243 The most formidable obstacle for affected states seeking the
agency's assistance against out-of-state air pollution was similar to the
one that has plagued affected state efforts to control interstate water
pollution for nearly a century - the need to prove that source state
polluters caused air quality violations in an affected state.2 " EPA in-
terpreted the statute to require the affected state petitioner to prove
that source state pollution was "significantly contributing" to air qual-
ity standard violations in the petitioning state, and the courts deferred
to that interpretation.245 In addition, the statute required affected
states to trace the violation to a specific source.24 6 EPA exacerbated
these difficulties when it refused to accept the mathematical and mete-
240. Id. § 7426(b).
241. Id.
242. For descriptions of the ineffectiveness of the pre-1990 CAA in dealing with
interstate pollution, see generally Kramer, supra note 218; Kay M. Crider, Interstate
Air Pollution: Over A Decade of Ineffective Regulation, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619
(1988).
243. New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 575, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Ginsburg, Ruth B., J.,
concurring). The agency declined to grant relief under any of the petitions filed under
§ 126(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7426 (1988). Id. According to one commentator, "it is difficult to
imagine a scenario where section 126 could be successfully invoked." Talkington, supra
note 4, at 966.
244. See Talkington, supra note 4, at 967.
245. Id. (citing Air Pollution Control Dist. v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071, 1088-93 (6th
Cir. 1984)). Another court rejected the position that one state could not emit any air
pollution into another state, as long as the downwind state had not yet attained the
national ambient air quality standards. Acceptance of this position,
would be to hold one state hostage to another's failure to enact the pollution con-
trol strategies necessary to conform to the requirements of the Clean Air Act ....
Section 7410(a)(2)(E)(i)(I) seems to contemplate a standard which would prohibit
SIP revisions only if the emissions they would permit would in and of themselves
prevent a nearby state from attaining the NAAQSs.
Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 1982) (emphasis added). Accord Air
Pollution Control Dist. v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071, 1093 (6th Cir. 1984) (applying the
Second Circuit's reasoning to a case with greater interstate emissions).
246. See Talkington, supra note 4, at 967 (citing Connecticut v. EPA, 656 F.2d 902,
909 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting the burden of proof required of affected states); New York v.
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orological computer models that affected states employed for ranges
longer than fifty kilometers, despite the fact that long-range transport
of pollution is the basis for a large share of interstate pollution.24
The 1990 CAA amendments 248 sought to redress some of these diffi-
culties. They therefore provide a model for similar amendments to the
CWA's interstate pollution provisions. First, the amendments sought
to lessen the burden of proof with respect to causation for affected
states seeking to force abatement of pollution generated elsewhere.
Although the amendments endorse the "significant contribution"
test,249 they address the "tracing" problem by authorizing an affected
state to petition EPA for a finding that a particular source "or group of
major stationary sources emits or would emit" air pollutants that con-
EPA, 710 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (6th Cir. 1983) (same); New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574,
578 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same)). According to Talkington:
[t]he main problem [was] that while a single source's emissions may not satisfy the
threshold standard, the cumulative emissions from several sources can have a sig-
nificant effect. Because SIP revisions are directed to individual plants or sources,
section 110 does not allow for review of cumulative impacts. Thus, as is commonly
the case, when cumulative impacts from aggregate sources significantly contribute
to a downwind state's pollution problems, the downwind state is without any rem-
edy because the cause (or significant contribution) cannot be traced to any single or
specific source.
Talkington, supra note 4, at 968. See also Kramer, supra note 218 ("The section 126
mechanism has been reduced to the long-range transport, multiple source problems for
which modeling and science have yet to come up with the answers.").
247. See Crider, supra note 242, at 634; Kramer, supra note 218, at 198. The courts
again deferred to EPA's exclusive reliance on short-range models. See, e.g., New York
v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (requiring judicial deference to an agency's
prediction when matter lies within the agency's area of expertise; Air Pollution Control
Dist. v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding a rational basis for the
agency's use of specific factors in its modeling study); New York v. EPA, 716 F.2d 440,
444 (7th Cir. 1983) (deferring to agency's choice of models as long as agency follows its
own rules and guidelines); New York v. EPA, 710 F.2d 1200, 1204 (6th Cir. 1983)
(same); Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147, 157-59 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that a court
may not substitute its own mathematical modeling techniques for those of the EPA).
Because the courts adopted a "significant contribution" test to trigger relief under the
§ 126 petition process,
the use of long-range models under the current state of the law will probably not
solve the causation problem.... [E]ven if a long-range model can pinpoint a partic-
ular source, this source, in and of itself, may not 'significantly contribute' to inter-
state pollution. The problem that several 'insignificant' sources can combine to
create a 'significant' effect in another state still remains.
Crider, supra note 242, at 637.
248. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2468 (1990).
249. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i) (Supp. 11 1990).
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tribute to air quality violations in the affected state.2 5 ° Similarly, Con-
gress could amend the CWA to prohibit a particular source or group of
sources 2 5 1 in an upstream state from significantly contributing to a vio-
lation of EPA-approved state water quality standards or EPA's
nondegradation policy in a downstream state. To further minimize the
difficulty of proving causation, instead of requiring proof of a "signifi-
cant contribution" to a violation of relevant standards, the amended
Act could include a more lenient standard. That new standard might
require an affected state to prove only that a source or group of sources
"may reasonably be anticipated to cause or contribute to" violations in
the affected state.252
Because the burden of proving causation is only one of the difficul-
ties that contributes to the ineffectiveness of the CWA's interstate pol-
lution provisions, Congress must go further. As indicated above,2 53 in
addition to the difficulty of proving causation, EPA's desire to avoid
involvement in interstate controversies is likely to thwart affected state
efforts under the current statutory framework to protect their resources
from out-of-state invasions. The 1990 CAA amendments also provide
a model for remedying this problem. The amendments authorize the
creation of interstate transport commissions to address transboundary
air pollution. If EPA believes that the interstate transport of air pollu-
tants contributes significantly to a violation of air quality standards in
other states,2 54 it may establish a "transport region" for the relevant
250. Id. §§ 7426(b), 7410(a)(2)(D).
251. This prohibition could apply not only to point sources subject to the NPDES
permit program, but also to non-point sources regulated under state water quality man-
agement plans. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1313(e) (1988). See also infra note 267 for a
discussion on the CWA's failure to impose significant pollution control measures on
non-point sources.
252. See supra notes 223-27 and accompanying text for discussion of a similar stan-
dard in the administrative context. If Congress wanted to further facilitate affected
state efforts to halt source state pollution, it could shift the burden of proof of causation.
For example, the Act could presume that existing violations of affected state standards
would be exacerbated by authorization for a new source to discharge (or authorization
for an existing source to increase the level of its discharges) into a body of water that
already violates affected state water quality standards. The result would be similar to
the interpretation of the Act adopted in Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 615-35.
See also supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text for a recommendation on similar
revisions to EPA's current application of the CWA.
253. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
254. The CWA amendments could substitute a less burdensome trigger for the "sig-
nificant contribution" test. See supra notes 248-50 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion on the CAA amendments.
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pollutant.255 Concurrently, EPA must establish a "transport commis-
sion," whose membership includes the governors of all states involved,
EPA's Administrator and Regional Administrators for all affected re-
gions, and state air pollution control officials.25 6 Each transport com-
mission must assess strategies for mitigating interstate air pollution and
recommend such measures to EPA. The objective is to ensure that the
SIPs of all states included in the transport region satisfy the general
requirement that SIPs prohibit sources from contributing to air quality
standard violations elsewhere.257 A transport commission may request
an EPA declaration that a state's SIP is inadequate to meet this man-
date. If EPA makes such a finding, the state involved must revise its
SIP.2
58
Congress could amend the CWA to establish similar mechanisms for
the creation and operation of interstate watersheds and commissions.
It could empower these commissions to request that EPA find that a
state permit program for point sources259 is inadequate to prevent
sources in upstream states from contributing to violations of down-
stream state water quality standards or the nondegradation policy. To
the extent that geographical, meteorological, and related factors make
it rational, Congress could combine air and water-related responsibili-
ties in a single administrative body. This approach might reduce the
opportunities for strategic bargaining that often hamper the negotia-
tion of interstate pollution compacts,26° because the same state might
be a source state with respect to air pollution but an affected state for
water.
2 6 1
255. 42 U.S.C. § 7506a(a) (Supp. H 1990).
256. Id. § 7506a(b)(1).
257. Id. § 7506a(b)(2).
258. Id. § 7506a(c).
259. The program could be expanded to cover state water quality management pro-
grams for non-point sources as well. See infra note 267.
260. High transaction costs present another obstacle to the successful negotiation
and implementation of interstate agreements. See Stewart, Interstate Resource Con-
flicts, supra note 63, at 243 n.15. The creation of interstate transport commissions
might minimize these costs. For example, a commission with established membership
and rules might reduce transaction costs.
261. Efforts to resolve interstate controversies through interstate compacts suggest
that a compact has a significant chance of working only where a transboundary problem
is symmetrical in nature. If the problem is asymmetrical (e.g., state A is polluting State
B, but not vice versa), the source state typically lacks the incentive to constrain its
industries. See Goble, supra note 58, at 789 n.14. Most transboundary pollution
problems are asymmetrical. Accordingly, downstream state members of an interstate
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These provisions may still fail to remove the barriers to the imple-
mentation of an effective interstate pollution control mechanism. The
CAA provisions described above, as would any CWA mechanism pat-
terned after them, depend on EPA's willingness to resolve interstate
disputes. The CAA interstate transport commissions described above
may recommend remedial measures to EPA, but may not compel EPA
to implement them. EPA might be as unwilling to accept the recom-
mendations of transport commissions as it has been to issue the find-
ings requested in CAA section 126 petition proceedings.262 If so, the
commission mechanism cannot effectively force intransigent states to
reduce discharges that contribute to interstate pollution.
To minimize the danger of a recalcitrant EPA, Congress could but-
tress the interstate commission mechanism in one of two ways. First,
Congress could authorize the initiation of citizen suits in which the
plaintiff (either an affected state or an individual who can demonstrate
standing) could request that the court declare a violation of affected
state standards despite EPA's refusal to make such a finding. The issu-
ance of the finding would trigger an obligation on the part of impli-
cated upstream states to revise their point source permit programs or
water quality management programs to eliminate the discharges that
are contributing to violations of downstream state standards.
Second, the statute could impose mandatory constraints on up-
stream states whose dischargers are responsible for downstream water
quality problems. EPA would have the authority to enforce those pro-
visions, just as it has the authority to remedy violations of the CWA's
other substantive provisions.2 63 Alternatively, Congress could vest in
the interstate commissions the authority to oversee the necessary reme-
dial measures without EPA's participation. In the 1990 CAA amend-
ments, Congress followed a similar approach. The statute itself created
a transport region for ozone pollution that covers most of the states in
the Northeast. 2" The Act requires that each state included in the re-
gion submit to EPA, within a fixed time period, revisions to its imple-
commission would tend to push for the imposition of limitations on upstream polluters,
while upstream states would resist such measures. However, if the asymmetries for air
and water pollution are reversed with respect to two or more states, one state's negotiat-
ing advantage with respect to one resource might be offset by a similar disadvantage
with respect to the other.
262. See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text for a discussion on the ineffec-
tiveness of the provisions under the CAA.
263. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1988).
264. 42 U.S.C. § 751 lc(b)(2) (Supp. 11 1990).
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mentation plan. These revisions must require reductions in emissions
that are contributing to the ozone pollution. They include compliance
with vehicle inspection and maintenance programs, application of con-
trol measures similar to vehicle refueling, and implementation of rea-
sonably available control technology for sources of volatile organic
compounds.2 65 Analogous CWA provisions could designate interstate
watersheds and require the states within the watershed to adopt, with-
out the need for further EPA action, specified control measures.26 6
These measures might include compliance by point sources267 with a
265. Id. § 751 lc(b)(1). In addition, a broad definition of the term "stationary
source" applies to all states within the region, thereby expanding the scope of the permit
program for new sources. Id. § 7511 c(b)(2). Upon the petition of any state within the
region, and based upon a majority vote of governors within the region, the commission
may recommend that EPA adopt additional control measures. Id. § 751lc(c)(1). If
EPA adopts such a recommendation, it must issue a finding that the SIPs of the source
states are inadequate and require revision. Id. § 7511c(c)(5).
266. Nearly 20 years ago, one commentator concluded that "[r]egional control of
water pollution undoubtedly represents the technical ideal.... [S]tandard-setting and
enforcement authorities [should] be set up on a regional basis conforming to the hydro-
logical characteristics, [and] ... at least some geographic diversity in water quality and
effluent standards [should] be allowed." Richard 0. Zerbe, Optimal Environmental Ju-
risdictions, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 193, 238 (1974).
267. The solutions suggested in this article still might fail to mitigate interstate
water pollution to any considerable extent. According to EPA, the largest remaining
source of water quality impairment is nonpoint source pollution that entities involved in
farming, construction sites, forestry, and mining generate. Nonpoint sources are re-
sponsible for about 60% of water quality standard violations. See Claudia Copeland,
Comprehensive Clean Air and Clean Water Permits: Is the Glass Still Just Half Full?, 21
ENVTL. L. 2135, 2169 (1991). The current CWA does little to address nonpoint source
pollution. See PERCIVAL, ET AL., supra note 163, at 945-51. If changes in the imple-
mentation of the Act's interstate pollution provisions fail to address this significant as-
pect of water pollution, such changes will not provide an adequate response to interstate
water quality problems. A discussion of the contributions of nonpoint sources to trans-
boundary water pollution is beyond the scope of this article, which focuses on the inade-
quacies of the CWA's interstate dispute resolution provisions.
Nevertheless, the article's proposed solutions easily could incorporate controls on
nonpoint source pollution. For example, the mandatory measures discussed in the text
could dictate that nonpoint sources comply with best management practices. In addi-
tion, Congress could adopt an emissions trading system for nonpoint sources patterned
after the acid rain provisions of the 1990 CAA amendments. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o
(Supp. 11 1990). See generally James T.B. Tripp & Daniel J. Dudek, Institutional
Guidelines for Designing Successful Transferable Rights Programs, 6 YALE J. ON REG.
369 (1989). These provisions authorize electric utilities, among others, to buy and sell
"allowances" to emit prescribed amounts of sulfur dioxide, a precursor to acid rain. 42
U.S.C. § 765lb(b) (Supp. 11 1990). Undue reliance on such a system is unwise at this
time, however, because it is too early to assess the practicability of the acid rain trading
program, and a similar program for nonpoint sources of water pollution might prove
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third level of technology-based effluent limitations more stringent than
those based on the best available technology.26 8
If Congress is reluctant to impose on upstream states the economic
burdens associated with more effective interstate pollution controls of
the type suggested here, it might consider combining such controls
with a scheme for compensating source states for those economic bur-
dens.2 69 This third legislative solution would entitle source states to
compensation only to the extent that a downstream state establishes
water quality requirements more stringent than the mandatory federal
minimum standards.270
Congress could allocate the obligation to compensate in a variety of
ways. For instance, it could place the obligation on the affected state in
the amount of the economic harm it imposes on the upstream state as a
result of the need to comply with its water quality standards.2 71 Alter-
natively, Congress could choose to distribute the burden of compensa-
even more difficult to implement. Identifying participants in the program would be
more difficult because nonpoint source pollution, unlike many of the emissions that
contribute to acid rain, does not emanate from a small group of facilities. Large electric
utilities are responsible for the bulk of the sulfur dioxide emissions that contribute to
acid rain. A second potential problem relates to the creation of pollution "hot spots" if
many polluters along the same water body purchase allowances from sellers located
elsewhere. Congress could mitigate this difficulty by prohibiting the purchase of more
than a certain percentage of the allowances initially available in a particular river basin
or watershed.
268. 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(b)(2)(A), (C), (F) (1988). The statute could further author-
ize the commission, upon a majority vote of the member states, to recommend addi-
tional actions to EPA. EPA could be authorized to require revisions of state permit
programs or water quality management programs or to require compliance with strin-
gent controls by individual sources. Congress could provide EPA with the authority to
withdraw all or part of a state's permit-issuing authority under 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)
(1988) if the agency determines that a state is not taking all necessary and reasonable
steps to mitigate any discharges that contribute to violations of EPA-approved water
quality standards or the non-degradation policy in another state.
269. Cf. Stewart, Interstate Resource Conflicts, supra note 63, at 263 (suggesting
that Congress compensate states for foregoing development of scenic areas or agreeing
to accept hazardous wastes).
270. The acid rain provisions of the 1990 CAA amendments essentially amount to a
similar form of inter-regional transfer payment system. Congress might want to provide
affected states with a "free ride" for part of any state efforts to exceed minimum federal
standards. It could do so by permitting an affected state to exceed federal standards by
a certain percentage without subjecting itself to the statutory compensation require-
ments. Beyond the specified percentages, the affected state would have to pay
compensation.
271. Congress could assign to EPA or an independent body of economic experts the
responsibility for determining the appropriate amount of compensation.
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tion more broadly. Interstate waters represent national assets, whose
preservation benefits the nation as a whole, therefore justifying a broad
cost allocation mechanism. Compensation could be extracted from the
general public in many ways, including affording tax breaks to indus-
tries that comply with the more stringent affected state standards, or
establishing a special fund to compensate those injured by a violation
of the affected state's standards. Revenues for the fund could be col-
lected through mechanisms similar to those used to finance the hazard-
ous waste Superfund.27 2
In my opinion, Congress should place the economic burden of inter-
state water pollution on those responsible for contributing to that pol-
lution - dischargers in the upstream state (or the people in the state
that benefit, through employment opportunities and otherwise, from
the activities of those dischargers). But compensation mechanisms like
those suggested here may make control mechanisms patterned after the
1990 CAA amendments politically palatable to legislators (particularly
those representing states whose industrial effluents wind up affecting
other states) who otherwise would not vote for such a program.
There is, of course, no guarantee that CWA amendments patterned
after the CAA would eliminate all of the deficiencies of the existing
statutory and regulatory program. It is far too early to assess the con-
sequences of the 1990 provisions.273 Only time will tell whether they
represent a significant step forward in legislative efforts to control in-
terstate air pollution. It might make sense, therefore, to delay adoption
of amendments to the CWA's interstate dispute resolution mechanisms
until the CAA amendments have been in place for several years. Nev-
ertheless, the 1990 CAA amendments provide fertile ground for the
development of new interstate water pollution control mechanisms.
They provide a basis for addressing each of the major stumbling blocks
that plague current efforts to control transboundary water pollution.
Thus, the amendments suggested above could eliminate the require-
ments that an affected state attribute downstream pollution to a partic-
ular source state discharger. They also might avoid the deadlock that
results from EPA's reluctance to take sides in interstate disputes.
272. 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988).
273. The 1990 CAA revisions have been criticized as "disappointingly shallow.
There remain formidable obstacles to effective regulation and enforcement, particularly
for downwind states .... Ultimately, downwind states remain at the mercy of EPA
discretion and political climate." Talkington, supra note 4, at 979-80.
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V. CONCLUSION
Affected states continue to search for an effective means to protect
their waters against pollution generated in other states. The Supreme
Court's decision in Arkansas v. Oklahoma upholds EPA's decision to
require upstream point sources to comply with affected state water
quality standards. The Court's decision, however, is unlikely to pro-
vide a satisfactory solution for affected states. Past interstate water
pollution controversies and efforts to implement the pre-1990 CAA's
interstate pollution provisions indicate that the approach that the
Court endorsed in the Arkansas case imposes an unrealistic burden on
affected states by requiring them to trace adverse water quality condi-
tions to particular upstream point sources.
EPA is authorized to devise a more efficacious approach by easing
affected states' burden of proving that water quality standard violations
are attributable to source state discharges. In the absence of such an
administrative transformation, affected states must direct their efforts
to procure greater protection for their waters to the other two branches
of government. They may be able to convince the courts that EPA's
implementation of the CWA's interstate pollution provisions consti-
tutes an abuse of discretion. Ultimately, however, their best hope for
relief probably rests with Congress. The most promising avenue for
bolstering the ability of downstream states to protect their water re-
sources is to pattern amendments to the CWA after the 1990 CAA
interstate pollution provisions.
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